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xxi Acknowledgments What brought the idea of this revised edition about was a coincidence. I was strolling between the stands of the Book Exhibition at the American Political Science Association when I came across the SUNY Press exhibit and press editor Dr. Michael Rinella. After exchanging pleasantries he asked if I were interested in a second edition of my book since the first edition fared very well. Because I was working on another book on Colombia, at first I was reluctant, but I thought a revised edition could provide me a chance to critically assess the war-system theory developed in the first in light of the changes in the conflict dynamics in Colombia since the breakdown of the peace talks in 2002. In retrospect, I am glad that I chose to do so because after I started writing the additional chapters for the second edition, the Colombian conflict took an interesting turn toward peaceful settlement, which makes this work timelier than ever. My field research in Colombia was conducted in the summers between 2002 and 2011, four of which were made possible by grants from the Fulbright Senior Scholar Research Program and Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá. The remaining were thanks to the support of friends who hosted me during my stay, namely professor Gary Hoskin, whose friendship and advice helped in carrying out this project. This work would not been possible without a special group of leading Colombian scholars, namely Francisco Leal Buitrago, Gonzalo Sánchez, Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, and Alvaro Camacho, whom painfully we lost in December 2011. Those scholars, either through their works and or through my vigorous exchange with them, made this revised edition possible. Over the years they became a family of sort helping me decipher the complexities and nuances of Colombia’s history and politics. To them I am greatly indebted. This edition would not been possible also without the insights of all of those who agreed to be interviewed. Particularly, I thank Carlos Lozano, director of daily newspaper Voz, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Colombia, for taking the time and enduring hours of probing questions. He was interviewed four times over the course of the last ten years; the last interview was conducted in August 2011. I also thank Jaime Caicedo, the xxii SYSTEMS OF VIOLENCE Secretary General of the Communist Party, who took time for an interview. I am also grateful to the numerous informants who were also interviewed, but whose identities are not disclosed for security reasons. The information they provided was important for this revised edition analysis. I also thank representatives of business groups FENALCO, ANDI, and Santo Domingo Group who took the time for the interviews. They informed this research about the mindset of the business elite and its stance toward the civil war, prospects of the state’s military victory, peace, and economic policy. This offered me a window for better appreciation of the role of the dominant classes in the political economy of the war system. I also thank Ernesto Baez and Julian Bolivar, leaders of the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC), the right-wing paramilitaries, who agreed to be interviewed just a few weeks before their arrests by the Colombian authorities in 2006. The information they provided helped in shedding some light on the AUC’s complex relationship with state agents, members of the dominant classes, and the political elite. I also would like to express my appreciation for the institutional support of the Department of Political Science at the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, which hosted me several times during the past decade. My thanks also to my home institution, Kean University in Union, New Jersey, my colleagues in the Political Science Department, and all of those who encouraged my endeavor. My gratitude is to my dear friend and editor, Ida Audeh, whose patience and good work helped in the preparation of this edition. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Brent Wilson, editor of the Journal of Conflict Studies, for granting permission to reprint of my article on the failure of the peace process (1998–2002) that appears in chapter 8. I am also very thankful to Dr. Virginia Bouvier, Senior Program Officer, on Latin America at the United States Peace Institute (USIP) for her effort and taking the time to write the preface of this edition. I am indebted to the SUNY Press editorial team. Dr. Michael Rinella who offered me the opportunity to...

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