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The Military and the Comfortable Impasse 35 This chapter introduces the military as one of the organizations that helped in creating and perpetuating the war system. It addresses three main questions: (1) why did the military choose a containment strategy instead of one designed to eliminate the guerrillas; (2) how did this containment strategy contribute to the formation and consolidation of a comfortable impasse; and (3) what type of institutional interests did the military form under the impasse contributing to the emergence and consolidation of the war system? My choice in discussing the Colombian military institutions, particularly its armed forces, is grounded on Theda Skocpol’s assumption that people situated in state’s agencies and institutions could articulate their own goals and at times carry them through.1 The core issue is determining the conditions under which this is made possible and how the goals and interests of a particular state organization intersect with those of other interest groups and social classes. Before tackling the core objectives of this chapter, it is important to provide some historical background about the military and its relationship with the other sectors of the state, complementing the discussion of the hegemonic crisis of the state discussed in chapter 2. THE MILITARY’S AUTONOMY Since the two military governments of Rojas Pinilla (1953–1957) and of the Military Junta (1957–1958), the military was gaining latitude in managing two core areas: state defense and public order. These two areas joined with the Doctrine of National Security, which the military adopted. The military consolidated its integration into the regional security system through its linkages with the United States, which provided training, technical assistance, and political indoctrination. Paradoxically, however, while the military became more integrated with the regional security system, it became more autonomous versus the executive and legislative branches of government.2 This was due to the deep rifts among the main sectors of the political elite, who had agreed to leave the area of national security outside their political bickering since the 1958 National Front. –3– 36 SYSTEMS OF VIOLENCE The interelite agreement on leaving the military outside their political disputes as a condition to maintain political stability after La Violencia (1948–1958) became one of the most enduring legacies of the National Front (1958–1974), surviving well into the twenty-first century. The National Pact and the return to civilian rule resulted from an agreement with then-ruling Military Junta. The military accepted the persecution of Rojas Pinilla in return for granting them latitude in managing its resources and public order. Consequently, the military became the only guarantor of political stability because the police forces took sides with the Conservative Party during the civil war. This arrangement was seen as political necessity and was executed during the consociational regime of the National Front. This interelite arrangement began to succeed in the 1970s and 1980s, when the state hegemony was further challenged by the rising power of the insurgency and the menace of organized crime. The military was the one to respond to these threats because the areas of security and defense lie within its almost exclusive mandate. The relative autonomy of the military is not specific to Colombia, or for that matter to Latin America, but rather most militaries enjoy some independence within democratic constitutional orders. In Colombia, however, this condition acquired a peculiar character due to an inherently weak state with a pronounced hegemonic crisis. This condition provided even more autonomy for the military in Colombia than in the rest of Latin America. The irony is that the military’s extended margin of freedom in managing its own affairs, defense, and public order policy may explain why the Colombian military shied away from seizing political power. It was reaping the benefits of this political order without the cost of being at the political front. It learned its lesson from the military dictatorships of Brazil and Argentina, which suffered significant losses in their military prestige, power, and economic resources during their rule forcing them to retreat to their barracks. Perhaps the best explanation to why the military shied away from seizing power in Colombia was presented by former attorney general Alfonso Valdivieso, who said: “The military always had its way by less drastic measures than taking power through the application of the strategy of the saber-rattling (Ruidos de Sables).”3 Under this strategy, “the military were able to extract concessions from the presidents and avoided losing their privileges,” Valdivieso concluded.4 In this...

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