The Presidential Leadership Dilemma: Between the Constitution and a Political Party

4 Presidents, Leverage, and Significant Public Policy

4 Presidents, Leverage, and Significant Public Policy Daniel E. Ponder The year 1994 was not good for President Bill Clinton. The failure of health care reform early in his administration helped spawn political weakness, an example of which was his inability to pass any sort of health care bill, his top domestic priority. This was particularly stinging since his party, the Democrats, controlled Congress. During midterm election years, a presidential appearance at a copartisan’s congressional campaign event is often coveted as a boon for that Member of Congress (MC), for it leaves voters with the impression that their MC is an important player in Washington and has an “in” with the president. But 1994 was no politics–as–usual year, and Clinton’s perceived ineffectiveness and low public approval (which had free–fallen fifteen points in the course of the year) forced him to endure the public humiliation of several Democrats asking him to not campaign for them as they clawed and scratched to keep hold of their seats. For those members, it seemed, an appearance by the unpopular president would hurt their reelection prospects. Sure enough, the year culminated in a near–historic beating for the president and his party. Democrats lost fifty–four House seats and ten in the Senate, thereby losing majority control in both chambers. The loss of the House 89 90 Daniel E. Ponder was particularly hard to endure, as it had not seen a Republican Speaker since Dwight Eisenhower lived in the White House. After the election, Republicans, particularly new Speaker Newt Gingrich (R–GA), dominated national politics. Barely three months into the 104th Congress the president was asked if he thought he could be heard above the din of the new Republican majority as it sought to turn campaign rhetoric into public policy. Clinton’s answer was telling. In what must be considered a low point in his presidency, Clinton responded weakly, “The president is relevant. The Constitution gives me relevance.”1 Bill Clinton and his presidency lacked a foothold in which to regain his footing, save for constitutional prerogatives such as the veto. His comment about relevance begged the question: how would he govern from such a weak position? In his memoirs, Clinton wrote that he looked for ways to compromise and negotiate with Republicans, but that he would wield the veto pen when he disagreed.2 Would he move to the left in seeming defiance of the electoral outcome? Move further to the right? Stake out a middle ground as part of his “triangulation” strategy? As it turned out, events and partisan politics would soon spur a reversal of the president’s political fortunes. The very next day, the nation was rocked by the tragic bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. Clinton’s formidable political skills were on full display as he reassured a stunned, scared, and grieving nation. The rally effect bolstered his approval ratings, and he hovered in the mid–to–upper 40s and lower 50s for the rest of the year. At the end of 1995, two government shutdowns that the public seemed to blame on the Republicans,3 and the president’s political resurrection was in full throttle. Barely a year after his “still relevant” plea, he enjoyed a healthy 56 percent approval rating. In 1994 Clinton lacked political leverage (while many in his party abandoned him). Not only did he reclaim it in 1995 and 1996, but the public’s verdict conditioned his resurgence. While presidents can and do use both the threat and the actual veto in governing, it is rarely a good thing for them long term (Gerald Ford leaps readily to mind). Indeed, these constitutional tools helped Clinton in the fight over the budget and government shutdown, but they are not the only things.4 Presidents seek approval, and they employ resources such as polling to try to increase their numbers if their standing is down.5 While approval is something presidents can seek for any number of reasons, the context in which they act relative to other institutions is telling. Though Clinton’s approval declined dramatically during 1994, public confidence in the presidency declined 5 percent from 1993 levels, while confidence 91 Presidents, Leverage, and Significant Public Policy in Congress (never high) was up in 1994 and 1995, but declined slightly into 1996.6 But where public trust in government was down steadily in 1995 and 1996...