The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran

Chapter 5: The Politics of Property in the Islamic Republic of Iran

5 The Politics of Property in the Islamic Republic of Iran Kaveh Ehsani “Acts of possession” are, in the now fashionable term, a “text”; and the common law rewards the author of that text. But as students of hermeneutics know, the clearest text may have ambiguous subtexts. —Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion The 1979 revolution transformed Iranian politics and society through a popu‑ lar movement that replaced the monarchy with a hybrid republican‑theocratic regime, a political system still in the throes of being defined by the array of conflicting social actors who shaped it into existence (Arjomand 1988, 103–210). Similar to other modern era radical transitions,1 the conflicts over the prevailing regimes of property have been at the center of the larger systemic contentions that have shaped postrevolution Iranian politics and institutions of governance.2 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the struggles over the demar‑ cations of property claims during the political transitions of postrevolution Iran by focusing on the close relationship between property, law, and power. The institution of private property was never challenged in the course of the Islamic Revolution, leading some observers to label it as a “bourgeois revo‑ lution” in the mould of the great French and American revolutions, which created strong states and legal systems to represent the interests and defend the property of the emerging middle classes (Abrahamian 1993, 39–59). Indeed, the shariʿa and the Shiʿa Jurisprudence are firmly committed to the preservation of private property (Mottahari, 1989). However, the shariʿa 153 154 Kaveh Ehsani and men of religion were not the only actors shaping the legal framework and institutions after 1979. The collapse of central authority through a mass movement meant that the idea of “justice” became an integral, albeit contested, force in shaping the shifting boundaries of property relations. As the new political order began to take shape, its emerging legal framework was in part formed by the presence of multiple wielders of force at local and national level, capable of defining and enforcing conflicting notions of justice, often centered on property. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic reflects these competing claims of a diverse and politically mobilized popula‑ tion and political actors.3 As Carol Rose (1994) suggests, to “read property as a text” requires viewing “property as story telling” (105). The story of property in postrevolution Iran is complex, and as of yet incomplete. Yet it is a narrative that will reveal much about the nature of power, the law, and property as a social relationship and a site of political and discursive contention, rather than a finite institution (Hay 1975, 17–64). The ongoing skirmish over setting the limits and forms of property is an indication of the ambivalence and the continuously shifting boundaries of the political, the social, and the economic (Hibou 2004). By historicizing the politics of property in postrevolution Iran, I intend to show how the changes in the ownership of land, natural resources, and economic, industrial, and financial assets do not reflect a straightforward expansion or retreat of predetermined domains of the public or the private, the state or non‑state. Rather, these shifting boundaries of ownership and the legal and political struggles and debates shaping them indicate the emergence of new modes of governance (Foucault 2004) and, in a sense, the continued consolidation of the state. De‑privatization, Privatization, and Re‑Privatization in the Islamic Republic Since president Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the most hotly contested economic debate in Iran has centered on the privatization of public assets and, more recently, on the elimination of subsidies for a vast array of essential goods and services in exchange for cash payments to selected segments of the population considered as deserving of support. Leading figures, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei the Leader, have called the privatization program “an economic revolution” to solve the country’s woes.4 But it is not only the economy that the magic of private ownership is supposed to cure. There seems to be a consensus across the political and ideological spectrum that public ownership of economic assets is the cause of a host of social and 155 The Politics of Property in the Islamic Republic of Iran political ills, from authoritarianism to corruption, clientelism, nepotism, and parasitic rentierism.5 This increasing penchant for “market fundamentalism” (Somers and Block 2005, 260–87) is, of course, not unique to the...