The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran

Chapter 4: Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Struggle for Relevance and Independence in Post‑Khomeini Iran

4 Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Struggle for Relevance and Independence in Post‑Khomeini Iran Farideh Farhi Introduction The heterogeneous or even dissonant elements of Iran’s constitutional order are widely known. Setting aside the reality that like in other countries in the Middle East the ideals expressed in the constitution or basic laws, par‑ ticularly in the arena of civil rights and freedom of expression and associa‑ tion, are routinely violated, the fact remains that Iran’s 1979 Constitution, as amended in 1989, is itself an amalgam of heterogeneous and at times conflicting principles, including theocratic sovereignty, popular representation, and social justice (Arjomand 1992b, 1993; Chehabi 1996; Schirazi 1997). Not surprisingly, the mere existence of this theoretical, or on‑paper heterogeneity, has contributed to the persistence of constitutional politics, or what can be described as constant argumentation and/or haggling over the rules of the political game. As such, more than other countries in which there is elite contestation, a constant in Iran’s political environment has not only been competition over access to political office and policy direction, but also a public, interactive, and mostly nonviolent process of calibration and recalibration of relative power held by various institutions. Within this contentious environment, the way the 290‑member1 Iranian Parliament—historically known as a Consultative Assembly or Majles (now Islamic as distinct to its national predecessor)—has struggled to maintain relevance and independence in a political order that includes two powerful 123 124 Farideh Farhi executive offices—those of the Leader (rahbar) and president—and at least two nonelective institutions—the Guardian and Expediency Councils2 —that impact the policymaking process is significant because, going back to its establishment in early 1900s, more than any other institution the Majles has been imagined as an expression of popular will and at least a partial check on arbitrary rule. In the Islamic Republic, it has also been, consistently, the preeminent arena in which factional conflicts have been played out publicly.3 As such, this deliberative institution rests at the crossroads of all the conflict‑ ing tendencies that have been incorporated in Iran’s postrevolutionary order. Such a predicament makes the common way of explaining the weakness of Iran’s Parliament in terms of the limitations imposed on it by clerical or nonelective institutions inadequate. The Majles is correctly identified as a “major player in Iranian politics” and the “public body where factional dif‑ ferences over economic, social, and political issues become public” (Baktiari 1996, x). At the same time, it is seen as weak in comparison to a whole host of nonelective institutions (Schirazi 1997, 86–104). But the Majles is also weak in relation to Iran’s other elective institution: the presidency. Discussing the overall influence of the Majles in postrevolutionary Iran, this chapter argues that Iran’s parliamentary predicament is made more complex because of these multiple weaknesses in relation to various elective and nonelective institutions. Facing a relatively powerful president and without the ability to resolve conflicts with that branch if the president chooses to ignore its mandates, the parliament has in many ways become more than a passive taker of limitations imposed on it by nonelective institutions. At critical times, it has also turned into an enabler of nonelective institutions in its confrontations with the executive branch while remaining helpless when facing their powers. Throughout its history, the Majles has indeed been a rancorous body whose main exertion of power in the Iranian political system has been in the form of confronting or harassing the president, particularly when assessing the yearly national budget and ministerial appointments and supervision. But when unable to make the executive branch conform to its legislative mandates, it has either ignored the executive violations out of necessity or relied on nonelective offices, particularly the office of rahbar, to weigh in and resolve the conflict. What this means is that different sessions of the parliament have ended up behaving slightly differently from each other in their interactions with the various elected and nonelected institutions of the Islamic system. For instance, the Second (1984–88), Third (1988–92), and Sixth (2000–2004) Majles sessions found themselves in constant confrontation with the more conservative nonelective Guardian Council, while the Fourth (1992–96), 125 The Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Struggle Seventh (2004–2008), and the Eighth (2008–2012) sessions were arenas for legislative‑executive confrontation. What has been persistent is conflict and contradictions that have underwritten legislative bottlenecks. As...