Notes
Notes Historical iNtroductioN. ProvidiNg reliable WitNess to tHe Past: tHe NeW troubled relatioNsHiP betWeeN HistoriaNs aNd believers 1. The distinctive character of historical research in the modern age, characterized , for example, by an emphasis upon differences between primary and secondary sources and the juridical usage of footnotes, has been described by scholars like George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), Arnaldo Momigliano in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), and Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 2. Both the testimonies of astrologers from the East and women corroborated the details of Jesus’ life. Early Christian apologists like Justin Martyr regularly turned to Plato and other classical sources for confirmation of their own beliefs. Augustine in Contra Faustum Manichaeum XVI, 21; De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur 6, 9; and, De Utilitate Credendi 16 argued that Jews, Manicheans, and “the multitude” could testify to the truth about the past and present even without understanding it. Aquinas held generally as outlined in Summa Theologica, Question 70 article 3, that every person could be counted upon to give reliable testimony—including Aristotle, in addition to Muslim philosophers and translators to whom he turned at need. Christian historians continue to appeal to the writings of ancient GrecoRoman and Jewish “historians” like Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, and Josephus in their reconstruction of the sacred past. 3. By eisogetical, I mean what is read into the text by the reader. In contrast, the exegetical refers to that which proceeds from the text itself. A similar use and deployment of the language of exegesis and eisogesis can be found in the work of Andrew Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 4. This common strategy, deployed by lay and traditional theologians alike, has been noted—for example—by Jacques Derrida in Specters of Marx, trans. P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 11–12, 136. 5. The primary focus of this monograph is the justification of historical belief. Specific focus upon how beliefs are justified is a mostly contemporary concern. In the past, what made beliefs “true” dominated scholarly debate. A belief was “true” if it was grounded in and accurately represented the actual facts of the matter uncolored by the influence of objective observers. Discussion of the justification of belief to varying degrees, however, in recent years has become differentiated from 111 earlier deliberation on what makes beliefs true. Beliefs, rather, are deemed justified “inferentially” by virtue of their relationship to other beliefs. Even if one accepts the controversial assertion that a belief is true if it represents facts of the matter established independently of the contribution of disengaged onlookers, reference to such facts by definition does not serve to justify belief. 6. The epistemological holism and “coherentist” model of justification that I refer to was developed primarily by W. V. Quine in his discussion of the “inscrutability of reference” experienced by the behaviorist translator in “Ontological Relativity ” in Ontological Relativity and Other Lectures (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969), 26–68 and in Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of the “Myth of the Given” in Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997 [1956]). 7. Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism without Method,” in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 63–77. cHaPter oNe. tHe etHics of fiNdiNg aNd MakiNg tHe Past 1. This phrase—wie es eigentlich gewesen—was notoriously coined by Leopold von Ranke in his 1821 lecture to the Prussian Academy of Sciences titled “Wilhelm von Humboldt: ‘On the Historian’s Task’ ” which first appeared in English translation in History and Theory 6 (1967), 57–71. This text is also contained in the collection of Ranke’s writings on historiography edited by G. Iggers and K. von Moltke titled The Theory and Practice of History (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), 5–23. When citing passages from this lecture, I will refer to the latter publication. 2. Paul Veyne, Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 5–7. Veyne offers another relatively late example of history being viewed as dependent primarily upon authoritative received traditions and texts. In his review of the textual history of Pascal’s Pensées, Veyne notes that scholars and publishers displayed no interest at all in establishing the best existent version of this text—in spite of the existence of...
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