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8 Religion and the Election of 1960 It is paradoxical. In 2008 Barack Obama faced no organized opposition to his candidacy based on race, whereas John Kennedy faced well‑organized opposition—overt and clandestine—because of religion. This is paradoxical first because the ideology of white supremacy and racism are historically more deeply rooted in American culture than anti‑Irish sentiments or anti‑Catholic nativism. Second, as has been pointed out throughout this volume and analyzed in detail in chapter 6, by the time Kennedy was nominated the Catholic Irish were fully incorporated, whereas when Obama was nominated blacks were semi‑incorporated. Related to this, invidious negative stereotypes about the Catholic Irish were largely things of the past in 1960, but such stereotypes about blacks were widespread in 2008. Third, the biracial, light‑skinned, elitist, bourgeois Obama was to many whites an ebony saint, but he was also undeniably black—perhaps not as black as Jesse Jackson, but black nevertheless. Kennedy, on the other hand, was not discernibly Irish or Catholic; certainly he was no Al Smith or Tip O’Neill. So in 1960 there was a fully incorporated Catholic community that constituted approximately 25 percent of the population and a thoroughly assimilated Catholic candidate. In addition, there existed well‑established principles of the separation of church and state and an explicit constitutional prohibition on any religious test for public office. But in 1959, polls indicated that 25 percent of Protestants said they would not vote for a qualified Catholic for president, compared to about 5 percent of whites in 2007 who said they would not vote for a qualified African American. Opposition to a Catholic president in 1960 included not only Protestant fundamentalists and bigots but liberals and civil libertarians; not just the Rev. Norman Vincent Peale but the Rev. Martin Luther King Sr. and perhaps his son as well. In 1960 there was, among thoughtful, enlightened segments of the public, a perception that there might be legitimate reasons to apply an unconstitutional religious test for the presidency. No such legitimacy—none—was suggested in 2008 119 120 Chapter 8 concerning race. This is not to suggest that race and racism were not factors in the 2008 election. They demonstrably were. Rather, it is to suggest that they were near universally considered as irrelevant considerations. In addition to this paradox, both Kennedy and Obama had to deal with skepticism about their candidacies within their own ethnic communities. Whether it was time for a Catholic or black to run, whether a Catholic or black could win, whether a Catholic or black candidacy might set back the interests of the group, whether these particular candidates had the requisite experience for the office, and, finally whether they were Catholic or black enough, Both Kennedy and Obama had to run “de‑ethnicized” campaigns while at the same time not alienating their ethnic bases. Both—reluctantly—found giving major speeches on religion and race strategically necessary in an effort to balance or blend ethnic and mainstream sentiments and concerns. In both 1960 and 2008 political elites and especially media elites played important roles in holding candidates to the norm of religious and racial tolerance, and in calling out campaign tactics that appeared to go beyond the boundaries of legitimate discourse. Finally, although both Kennedy and Obama were victorious the available evidence indicates that both suffered an “ethnic deficit.” When Joe Kennedy was asked shortly after the 1960 election how many states his son would have won if he been Episcopalian, without hesitation he responded, “Fifty.”1 Kennedy would not have won fifty states if he had been Protestant, and Obama would not have won fifty if he had been white, but given the strategic electoral environments in 1960 and 2008 both would have won by larger margins if they had been white Anglo‑Saxon Protestants. The Kennedy family’s long quest for the presidency began in earnest at the 1956 Democratic Convention. In that year with the presidential nomination firmly secured, Adlai Stevenson leaked to the press the idea that he might select a Catholic—either New York City Mayor Robert Wagner or John Kennedy—for the vice presidential nomination. The Kennedy family organization under the leadership of Joe Kennedy immediately swung into action to secure the nomination.2 Theodore Sorensen was directed to prepare a memorandum showing the size and strategic significance of the “Catholic vote.” Sorensen argued that the Catholic vote, which comprised 25 percent of the electorate, was concentrated in California...

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