In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

SEVEN FORCE, DIFFERENCE, AND OPPOSITION INTRODUCTION In the previous chapter, we explored the differences between the approaches of Hegel and Deleuze in detail, in relation to their interpretations of the differential calculus and the Kantian antinomies. These differences of approach were not related to each other directly, however, but were mediated through their work on Kant and the calculus. While the logics of both Hegel and Deleuze relate to the same problematics—namely, the antinomies and aporias of what Deleuze calls finite representation and Hegel, the viewpoint of the understanding—they would seem to remain incongruent with each other. Deleuze writes that “the philosophy of difference must be wary of turning into the discourse of beautiful souls: differences, nothing but differences , in a peaceful coexistence” (DR, 207), and the danger of remaining a beautiful soul is clearly recognized also by Hegel, for whom it is a necessary, but partial moment of our relations to the world. In this chapter, I want to relate these two different approaches to each other directly, in order to determine what resources either position has to provide a critique of the other. This presents an obvious difficulty in that Hegel was not acquainted with the work of Deleuze, but this does not mean that the Hegelian system does not have resources to engage with transcendental empiricism. As we have already seen in chapter 5, Hegel presents a dialectic of essence and appearance that tries to show that essence only appears to underlie appearance, as something akin to a transcendental illusion generated by the movement of reason itself. Hegel takes this kind of approach in the Phenomenology in the section on force and the understanding and presents a similar critique of Schelling’s philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. We will therefore try to see whether Hegel’s approach in these cases can be used to provide a critique of Deleuze’s dual ontology of virtual and actual, or if the novelty of Deleuze’s approach led to Hegel’s critique missing its 187 188 HEGEL, DELEUZE, AND THE CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATION mark. A further, and as it will turn out, related difficulty that we will look at emerges from Deleuze’s slogan that “just as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose dx to not-A, the symbol of difference to that of contradiction” (DR, 170). This is once again the problem of the beautiful soul: “The beautiful soul is in effect the one who sees differences everywhere and appeals to them only as respectable, reconcilable or federative differences , while history continues to be made through bloody contradictions” (DR, 52). It is this position that Deleuze seeks to avoid. The question therefore arises: how are we to understand Deleuze’s use of the concept of opposition here if difference is to be seen as purely affirmative or in order words, nonnegative? This problem, the relation of opposition to difference, will therefore occupy us for the remainder of this chapter, in particular in regard to its expression in the problems of the one and the many and of the supersensible world. We will begin first with the problem of essence and appearance and the supersensible world, which we will explore through Hegel’s dialectic of force and the understanding. FORCE AND THE UNDERSTANDING As we saw in the previous chapter, Deleuze characterizes Hegel’s philosophy as one of infinite or orgiastic representation, in contrast to his own philosophy of difference, which attempts to incorporate a subrepresentational element. By this, he means that instead of attempting to resolve the difficulties of representation by moving to a transcendental position, Hegel uses these difficulties to move from the finite thought of representation to infinite thought through an acceptance of the contradictory nature of the world. We also saw in chapter 5 how this Hegelian dialectic led to a renunciation of the conception of essence as somehow providing the ground for appearance, since essence turns out to be, on a dialectical reading, “the seeming of itself within itself” (SL, 398, translation modified), that is, the actual process of appearing. Such a result would clearly present difficulties for a transcendental philosophy such as Deleuze’s, where the object is conceived of as doubled, provided we could show that the Deleuzian concept of transcendental field can be captured within this structure of the dialectic. Hegel’s dialectic of essence would allow the ‘doubled’ aspect of the object to be reincorporated into a single ontological plane, thus...

Share