Theology within the Bounds of Language: A Methodological Tour

16. Verbal Disagreement

Chapter 16 ‫ﱾﱻ‬ Verbal Disagreement It was God, we read in Genesis, who brought about the multiplication of languages at Babel. How, though, are we to account for the confusion of tongues, less obvious so more insidious, of those who speak the same natural language? Though most disagreements are genuine, many are merely verbal. A principal explanation of this latter, unfortunate phenomenon is that, intentionally or not, people often pay slight attention to language as a determinant of truth or assertability. Sometimes one party heeds language’s authority while the other party does not; sometimes neither party does. Several pages in C. S. Lewis’s Mere Christianity nicely illustrate the first possibility. Objections have been expressed, Lewis writes, against my use of the word Christian to mean one who accepts the common doctrines of Christianity. People ask: “Who are you, to lay down who is, and who is not a Christian ?” or “May not many a man who cannot believe these doctrines be far more truly a Christian, far closer to the spirit of Christ, than some who do?” Now this objection is in one sense very right, very charitable, very spiritual, very sensitive. It has every amiable quality except that of being useful. We simply cannot, without disaster, use language as these objectors want us to use it.1 Lewis explains fully, with his customary clarity and style, why we cannot: Now if once we allow people to start spiritualizing and refining, or as they might say “deepening,” the sense of the 145 146 Theology within the Bounds of Language word Christian, it too will speedily become a useless word. In the first place, Christians themselves will never be able to apply it to anyone. It is not for us to say who, in the deepest sense, is or is not close to the spirit of Christ. We do not see into men’s hearts. We cannot judge, and are forbidden to judge. It would be wicked arrogance for us to say that any man is, or is not, a Christian in this refined sense. And obviously a word which we can never apply is not going to be a very useful word. As for unbelievers, they will no doubt cheerfully use the word in the refined sense. It will become in their mouths simply a term of praise. In calling anyone a Christian they will mean that they think him a good man. But that way of using the word will be no enrichment of the language, for we already have the word good. Meanwhile, the word Christian will have been spoiled for any really useful purpose it might have served.2 Not only does Lewis’s position agree with and illustrate the Principle of Relative Similarity, but it admirably suggests the virtues of the principle and its corresponding norm. People do not customarily call virtuous Moslems, Buddhists, Taoists, agnostics, or atheists “Christians.” In English , as in other languages, “Moslem,” “Buddhist,” “Taoist,” “agnostic,” and “atheist” are rival expressions, conflicting with “Christian.” To be understood and to say what you wish to say, it is best to leave both them and “Christian” as they are. Lewis, wise in the way of words, does not simply contradict those who speak in the way he critiques, for he is aware that his disagreement with them is verbal, not factual. The people they call Christians may indeed be as spiritual and fine as alleged. When, however, neither side in a debate is attentive to language, neither side may heed the established use of words and thicker verbal fog may then descend on the proceedings. The samples we will now examine illustrate this possibility. More specifically, they reveal the following recurring configuration: (1) Verdicts differ on some debated question. (2) The disagreement is made possible by the fact that neither side in the debate has regard for the authority of language. (3) In place of language, the conflicting answers are dictated by conflicting values or commitments. (4) Were the disputants to consult the language they speak, they would find that it backs neither side in preference to the other. (5) Indeed, they would discover that it backs no answer, or no single answer, to the debated question. (6) Hence, according to chapter 4, there is no answer, or no single answer, to the question. (7) In an important sense, then, the debate 147 Verbal Disagreement is merely verbal. (8) Attention should therefore...