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Chapter 10 ‫ﱾﱻ‬ Universal Claims (Factual) “What then is truth?” asked Friedrich Nietzsche. “A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms,” he replied, “—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people.”1 One may wonder at such a sweeping claim. Are none of the items in the morning paper veridical? Are none of Nietzsche’s own statements true? What about the one just quoted? Doubtless Nietzsche would have dismissed such cavils: large truths should be stated boldly. Or perhaps, more radically: the false god of truth should no longer hold sway. But in that case, what new deity should replace it? In this study, I have assumed an interest in truth. Although not all theologians share that commitment, I think most still do, and should. When rightly understood, truth can be recognized as irreplaceable, indispensable . The present chapter will therefore focus on the less radical issue: granted an interest in truth, should theologians indulge, as they frequently do, in bold statements similar to Nietzsche’s? Repeatedly, the Principle of Relative Similarity would declare such statements false, and repeatedly one has the impression that no such principle has been consulted but should have been, for effective communication. Yet, surely, on occasion there is place for the bold statement, the sweeping generalization—precisely for the sake of more effective communication? This I grant, with reservations, but theologians’ universal claims are often motivated by something other than a desire for successful communication. The Appeal of Universality By “universal” claims I mean broad, definite assertions excluding all exceptions. Statements employing “all,” “always,” “every,” and the like 91 92 Theology within the Bounds of Language qualify, as do those employing “no,” “none,” “never,” and the like. The term only may also be included since, although it makes no claim about every member of the indicated class, excluding or including it, it does exclude all nonmembers. Thus, the Council of Florence, for example, might have asserted, equivalently, that only those inside the church could be saved instead of declaring, as it did, that no one outside the church could be saved. As one attraction of such assertions the last chapter suggested their role as universal premises permitting valid deductive inference. From “Some people are sinners” it is not possible to infer “I am a sinner.” From “Most people are offered forgiveness” it is not possible to infer “Judas was offered forgiveness.” “All,” “none,” “never,” “only,” “always”—such are the words that valid deduction typically has need of; “some,” “most,” “usually,” “typically,” “seldom,” or the like do not suffice. Universal claims also enjoy greater prestige than limited, particular assertions. “All” or “only” statements may rate as “theses” or “theories,” whereas mere assertions of what is “usually,” “often,” or “seldom” the case do not merit such recognition. Galileo did not say that the Earth usually revolves around the sun. Newton did not claim that most bodies attract one another. Chemists have not maintained that water typically is H2 O. I cite scientific examples because in our time scientific thinking powerfully affects that in other areas, including theology to some extent (recall quotations in chapter 1 concerning the “scientific” conduct of theology). However, more than the deductive utility or theoretical prestige of universal assertions accounts for their appeal. The great attraction of such claims is precisely their universality. “Most” and “usually” have considerable breadth, but “all” and “always” have more. “Most” and “usually” introduce some order into the chaos of varied individual cases, but “all” and “always” introduce more. They and their kin (“none,” “never,” “only,” etc.) are, in addition, more definite and precise. They include all or exclude all, whereas “most,” “usually,” “often,” and the like leave indefinite the status of any individual member of the class named. And natural science has no monopoly on the desire for such precision and such comprehensive grasp. Both are values. Both attract theologians as well as philosophers, scientists, and others. Language has played a subtle but powerful role in making universal claims look feasible as well as attractive. In ways chapter 3 noted, general terms for a class of things suggest essences shared by all and only members of that class. Thus, general terms being basic components of language, the essences which they suggest seem basic components of reality. Life is one thing, humanity is one thing, truth is one thing, [3.137.185.180] Project MUSE (2024-04-25...

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