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Chapter 6 A Defense of Ren-Based Interpretation of Early Confucian Ethics Shirong Luo Virtue ethics, especially that of the Aristotelian strain, has been described as a type of “agent-centered” in contrast to “act-centered” moral theory. But as contemporary virtue ethics matures and differentiates, a finer distinction becomes necessary.1 According to Michael Slote, virtue ethical approaches are to be divided into three categories: agent-focused, agent-prior, and agent-based. All virtue ethical theories are at least agent-focused, meaning that one’s ethical theory gives pride of place and emphasizes the centrality of the actions of virtuous individuals. In addition to being agent-focused, agent-prior theories insist that the moral worth of actions depends on and derives from the agent’s character traits. All agent-based theories are agent-prior, but the difference is that the former derive the value of good actions directly and exclusively from admirable qualities internal to the agent.2 Slote argues that among these three alternatives, only agent-based theories are pure and freestanding forms of virtue ethics because they base ethical assessment entirely on the admirableness or reprehensibility of the inner qualities of the agent. Slote’s own theory is agent-based because it elects the virtue of empathic caring as the basis of moral evaluation. He maintains that the goodness of caring is intuitively clear, and therefore there is no need for it to be further explicated in terms of other value concepts. By contrast, Aristotelian ethics, David Hume’s moral sentimentalism, and Nel Noddings’s ethics of caring can only be characterized as “agent-prior” because the value of virtue has to be further explained by the desirability of eudaimonia, utility, or the caring relationship—notwithstanding the fact that they all place the ethical assessment of the agent prior to the evaluation of his or her action. 123 124 Shirong Luo Anyone who is adequately conversant with the Analects cannot help but be impressed by the centrality of ren 仁 in Kongzi’s ethical teachings.3 Kongzi declares that once we set our hearts on ren, we will be free from immorality (Analects 4.4). He also maintains that a person who is fond of ren cannot be surpassed (4.6). Since ren is rendered into English as “caring,” “benevolence,” “humanity,” or “compassion,” it is natural to see the connection between Kongzi’s ethics and the agent-based virtue theory advocated by Slote. We live in an increasingly connected world in which a general concern for human beings has become a central issue for contemporary moral philosophy . I believe that early Confucian ethics has ample resources to address such concern. A recasting of Kongzi’s moral teachings in agent-based virtue ethics terms enables us to make cogent arguments for its relevance to many issues within as well as beyond the purview of ethics. For early Confucians, a general concern for humanity is not paying lip service or offering help to the needy in a perfunctory manner. On the contrary, it should be a manifestation of one’s inner moral force de 德 (virtue).4 Western virtue ethics tends to focus more on the issues of what it means to be virtuous and how we can best justify our concerns for others, but less on how we should acquire virtue, in other words, the issue of moral self-cultivation. It is in this area that the strength of early Confucian ethics is manifest. If virtue is the sole basis of ethical judgment in Confucian morality, then early Confucians’ preoccupation with moral self-cultivation makes a great deal of sense. Kongzi’s teachings, however, like those of many other great thinkers, leave room for more than one interpretation. There is resistance in various forms to recasting early Confucian ethics in agent-based terms. For instance, among contemporary commentators there has been a debate about whether the notion of ritual (li 禮) in early Confucian ethics is more basic than ren.5 The notion of way (dao 道) also seems to be a strong candidate to compete with ren.6 As I indicate below, there are serious difficulties with reading early Confucian ethics as based in ritual or the dao. My main focus, however, is on presenting arguments against a more formidable challenge by D. C. Lau who claims that no moral virtue can be the sole basis of ethics. Lau thinks that Confucian ethics rests ultimately on propriety (yi 義) rather than ren.7 This view is classified as yi-based...

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