Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination

Section 3. Sovereign Wit and the End of Alienation (Chapter 10)

Section 3 Sovereign Wit and the End of Alienation (Chapter 10) In the previous chapters of Part II, we saw first how a sovereign self became alienated when it did not recognize the social shape of its power; we then saw how self-consciousness about the multiple negative determinations of cultural perspectives and entities gave rise to wit as both symptom of and partial cure for alienation; we analyzed those “crimes” against culture and language in terms of negative infinite judgments; and finally, we traced the difficult route through Henry V’s evil pageantry. We concluded that the sovereign self that is self-certain in its self-deception is the nadir of justice since it portrays tyranny and war as the right of the virtuous. Henry V did not redeem time. In Chapter 10, we look at what might constitute justice (a real social “redemption of time”), and whether it necessarily involves a religious standpoint. We conclude that the necessary starting point of justice is forgiveness. In Part I of this chapter, we begin with Lukács’ claim that for Hegel, ethical life is necessarily and irredeemably tragic. I investigate whether social redemption through punishment and pardon in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right provides a counter to Lukács’ claim. In Part II of this chapter, I contrast Henry V’s punishing solutions with Hegel’s theory of monarchic pardon (in the Philosophy of Right). Monarchic pardon is a higher form of justice than mere policymaking. This sublating activity of subjectivity is a positive, rationalizing force in the State, one that destabilizes while providing the means of moving forward in ethical life. Nonetheless, even when the State has achieved the status of being a “rational organism,” the internal possibilities of crime and evil and the role of war as 223 224 Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination a necessary destabilizing force at the international level show that, in Hegel’s account, Objective Spirit remains permeated by tragedies. I conclude Part II of this chapter by expanding the notion of pardon into the following assertion: The philosophical truth of monarchic pardon is that forgiveness must be a part of every person’s ethical behavior. The concept of pardon (and its pervasive social character as forgiveness) has therefore opened up a new vantage point for redemption. It invokes an absolute standpoint that is not that of the State but rather that of Absolute Spirit. Hegel claims that pardon imports a religious standpoint into Objective Spirit. This leads us to question whether forgiveness imports a religious standpoint into Absolute Spirit (i.e., into Art and Philosophy as well as Religion ); whether forgiveness inaugurates a wit that is not limited to religion. In other words, for Hegel and for Shakespeare, what is the nature of a successful redemption of time? In Part III of this chapter, I begin answering these questions.1 I do so by looking at the last of the History plays: Henry VIII. In that play, we find, on the one hand, Cardinal Wolsey. He is a man who benefits from staging political conflict. On the other hand, at the end of the play, there is a movement away from political conflict and alienation. Forgiveness sweeps through the court. The end point of that movement is the baptism of Princess Elizabeth. Henry VIII moves from a series of tragedies to a happy ending. It is therefore a fitting segue to the final two chapters of our book. There, we show how Shakespeare’s Romance plays, and Hegelian phenomenology, turn the “tragedy of ethical life” into the comedy of “Absolute Spirit.” ...