Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination

Part II. Ethical Life and the History Plays: The Development of Negative Infinite Judgment and the Limits of the Sovereign Self

Part II Ethical Life and the History Plays The Development of Negative Infinite Judgment and the Limits of the Sovereign Self Introduction to Part II In Part I, we analyzed basic elements in Shakespearean comic and tragic drama and in Hegel’s philosophy. We did this within the general framework of trying to understand various characters’ moral imaginations in terms of their ability or failure to move beyond contradictions. We ended with the notion of wonder at what that urge is, and with the recognition that wonder is just the beginning. Now we need to see how this urge develops in society. Part II investigates moral imagination in relation to Shakespeare’s History plays and to what Hegel calls Ethical Life.1 Here, we are concerned with a wider arena of (princely) power and politics. We investigate whether and how wonder develops into justice. We do this by tracing the development of sovereign self-consciousness from Richard II, through Falstaff and Hal under Henry IV, to Hal as Henry V.2 Of Shakespeare’s History plays, we are primarily (though not exclusively ) concerned with Shakespeare’s Richard II, Henry IV parts one and two, and Henry V. Our phenomenological insights about these princely transitions come from developments in the Phenomenology of Spirit—from the chapter on Reason through several sections of the chapter on Spirit. I also draw heavily on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, with occasional references to the Encyclopedia Logic. 113 114 Hegel and Shakespeare on Moral Imagination Summary of the Three Sections of Part II Section 1: Sovereign Alienation and the Development of Wit (Chapters 5 and 6) In the first chapter of Part II (Chapter 5), we look at how Richard II’s undeveloped form of the “I” that is a “we” (as what Hegel calls “Active Reason”) is necessarily self-alienated and unjust. In Chapter 6, we move from Sovereign Reason to Spirit in order to revisit alienation. In that chapter, I introduce Hegel’s notion of “Negative Infinite Judgments” in terms of crimes of theft (against possession) and crimes of wit (against language). Wit is a form of Spirit: It is a self-conscious “I” that is “we.” But wit is a product and symptom of cultural alienation. The development of wit is the cure for that alienation. In the character of Falstaff, we see how wit falls short of justice but also how it is what must be developed if wonder is to develop into justice. Section 2: Sovereign Deceit and the Rejection of Wit (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) In the next three chapters (7 through 9), I analyze the character of Hal as Henry V. The overarching argument is that Henry V’s rejection of wit leads negative infinite judgment and the sovereign self to self-deceit. According to Hegel, self-deceit is the highest form of hypocrisy and the high-water mark of evil. Henry V’s route is not how we arrive at justice. I begin by looking at Henry V’s apparent virtue (Chapter 7). I then look at Hegel’s theory of evil with a particular focus on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Chapter 8). In that chapter, we see that for Hegel, evil, as one of three major forms of negative infinite judgment, is in fact a necessary moment in the development of the State (alongside crime and war). I explain how for Hegel, overcoming crime pushes Abstract Right to become Morality, and how overcoming evil pushes society beyond Morality to Ethical Society.3 From this analysis, I show the dialectical necessity and limits of Falstaff’s crimes and, more importantly, of Henry V’s evil moral posturing. In Chapter 9, I compare Henry V to Richard III, Macbeth, and Hamlet. This comparison reveals the details of how sovereign conscience can slip into evil, and it shows the nature of Henry V’s self-deceit. Despite his sovereign successes, we see why Henry V’s “moral” evil is a profound form of alienation that does not produce a just ethical order. Section 3: Sovereign Wit and the End of Alienation (Chapter 10) To point beyond the tragedies of ethical life, in the conclusion of Part II (Chapter 10), I contrast two kinds of justice. That is, I contrast princely policy 115 Ethical Life and the History of Plays and monarchic pardon. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel calls monarchic pardon “the majesty of mind...