-
6. Swift Trust, Speedy Organizing
- State University of New York Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
67 6 Swift Trust, Speedy Organizing Cohesion and Modularity in Military Operations In popular imagery, scholarly portrayals, and professional depictions, “unit cohesion”—the organic imagery of military forces—is seen as a prime precondition for effective military action (Kellet 1987). Thus, for example, synthesizing and integrating previous writings, Smith (1983) states that of all motivating factors—group cohesion, unit allegiance and pride, ideology and patriotism, lack of alternatives, self-preservation and leadership—only small-unit cohesion does not deteriorate after prolonged exposure to combat. He goes on to say: This cohesion is the single most important sustaining and motivating force for combat soldiers. Simply put, soldiers fight because of the other members of their small unit. . . . Although cases of strong company-level cohesion exist, research has shown that in combat, as soldiers draw closer to the squad, they identify with the company less. (Smith 1983, 6) Moreover, research has shown that small-unit cohesion provides shelter from battlefield horrors and enables soldiers to persevere in combat, providing them with security, the belief that the threat can be overcome , a coping mechanism to deal with the trauma of death and killing , and a sense that their contribution has meaning (Boer 2001, 33). As Boer (2001, 36) summarizes: In small army units, horizontal (between peers) and vertical (between leaders and the led) cohesion that developed 68 Rethinking Contemporary Warfare sequentially over time are of prime importance. In cohesive units there is trust, mutual respect, confidence, and understanding among the members of the unit. These affective bonds enable personnel to persevere in the face of physical discomfort, danger and fear. Members of cohesive units can depend on each other’s competence, count on their comrades to take care of them, and trust their leaders not to abandon them. It is cohesion that enables a unit to become effective in combat. Supportive leaders who are competent, considerate, and accessible play crucial roles by demonstrating that they trust their subordinates and are worthy of trust. Noonan and Hillen (2002), for their part, argue that history is replete with battles such as Rourke’s Drift, Goose Green, Entebbe, and Mogadishu , which have shown that skilled and cohesive units are eminently capable of overcoming numerically superior but qualitatively inferior forces. Yet when examined more closely, it seems that engagements fought in places such as Entebbe or Mogadishu were actually waged not by cohesive units but rather by amalgamations of forces tailored to fit specific and limited missions. Indeed, the experience of the Israel Defense Forces during the first stages of the Al-Aqsa Intifada seems to question contentions about the centrality of cohesion for military undertakings. During the first year of the conflict, many of the regular frameworks of the military were dissolved and new ones established. Indeed, tightly knit, “organic” units marked by strong cohesion were splintered or dispersed, and their troops were attached to others in a modular form to create “instant units.” Indeed, one of the strongest sentiments that came out in interviews we held during the first two years of the Intifada was centered on complaints that regular frameworks of the force were dissolved and new ones established. An ex-battalion commander from the Golani infantry brigade talked about a situation in which there were “fragments” (resisim) of units deployed over a large area, a deputy commander from the paratroopers talked about the “splintering” of his company, and a company commander from the Nahal brigade talked about “this crazy dispersal.” The image of the “splintering” or “dispersal” of units refers to how members of regular units are socially cut off from each other. Thus some squads, platoons, or even individual soldiers were cut off from social contact with other members of the combat company for weeks and even months. In one armored unit, deployed near the center of Gaza, interviewees repeatedly told that us they did not yet [3.91.79.134] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 07:56 GMT) 69 Swift Trust, Speedy Organizing have the chance to meet the new soldiers who had rotated into their unit over the past months. Yet troops who staff the “splinters” of the original organic units are not placed in an alienated vacuum. Rather, they find themselves as members of what we call “instant units.” We encountered numerous examples of such frameworks: joining one tank and its crew to an infantry platoon or a squad of border policemen to create a new element, or, say, some members of a company assemble...