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3 True Versions and Cultural Bias This chapter begins the argument for the legitimacy of an American Indian world version from a constructivist perspective. It begins with a critique of Goodman’s view, in which I gently suggest that his constructive nominalism cannot be the whole story, because mental acts of world construction are real, members of kinds, and necessarily antecedent to the actual worlds constructed; hence my view, which I call constructive realism. I argue that because Goodman’s criteria for the ultimate acceptability of a world version are culturally biased, they beg the question of acceptability against any non-Western world version, especially a Native world version. Finally, I argue that a culturally sophisticated reinterpretation of Goodman’s criteria should find an American Indian world version ultimately acceptable, hence numbered among the internally consistent, equally privileged, well-made actual worlds. Constructive Realism: Variations on a Theme by Goodman My very first philosophy professor, Bernard McCormick, made this argument about radical relativist views that still resonates: It cannot be the case that everything is relative, for the absoluteness of the claim is self-refuting. Either the claim “everything is relative” is itself relative, thus opening the door to absolutes, or “everything is relative” is itself an absolute, so the claim is false. Now, it is unclear to me how Goodman’s radical relativism can escape this sort of self-referential paradox, for his view is expressed in language, and so like every other statement, theory, model, or version, its objects and kinds—and its facts—are fabricated by language. But the relevant kinds in Goodman’s constructivist theory include the very kinds of world-constructing processes—among them composition, decomposition, weighting, and ordering—used to make all world versions, including his own. So, if all relevant kinds are fabrications within a particular version, 39 40 The Dance of Person and Place then Goodman cannot give a general account of “ways of world making”! Metaphorically speaking, he cannot see beyond the bounds of his own particular version because he cannot give an account that applies to all versions. Goodman might reply, “well, so much the better,” as Nietzsche (1989: 31–33) did when answering a similar criticism, but I believe there is a more satisfying response. Goodman argues for an ontological pluralism, that there is a multiplicity of actual, equally privileged world versions, where we are to understand true world versions as extensionally isomorphic to an ultimately acceptable version. Remember, however, that world versions do not materialize out of thin air; they are constructed using the materials from other world versions. Over time, theories and models are refinements of or reactions against their predecessors. But in another more important sense these symbol systems must arise from something else—something that is not a mere antecedent symbol system. Statements, theories, models, and the entire world versions that contain them are products of our acts of construction—our composings and decomposings, weightings and orderings, among them. And, I maintain, there simply could not be the succession or multiplicity of world versions Goodman embraces without the various kinds of acts of construction that produce them. To deny this would be, by analogy, to deny that the acts of carpenters are necessary to transform the raw materials of boards and nails into a house. Houses are constructed from other materials, just as world versions are constructed from other world versions—but someone must engage in the acts of constructing.1 Now, the acts of carpentry—hammering, sawing, and so forth—are independent of any particular house. And just as many different wooden structures can be built using a single set of tools, the many equally privileged worlds are constructed using a common set of world-constructing processes, like composings, weightings, and orderings. A multiplicity of worlds does not imply a multiplicity of ways of constructing those worlds. Moreover, it seems to me that we cannot give a general theory of how a multiplicity of actual worlds is constructed—a theory that applies to all versions without the perils of self-reference—unless world-constructing acts are understood as being members of kinds that are independent of any and all particular versions. A rough, but yet helpful way to think about what I am proposing—a view I call constructive realism—is this: Whenever the nominalist Goodman talks about a kind of world version constructing process—composition, decomposition , weighting, ordering, and so on—I understand them not as fabricated kinds—as mere extensions of a...

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