Jewish Philosophy in a Secular Age

4. Revelation

Chapter Four Revelation 1. The Rationalist's Perspective Revelation, or as it is known in Jewish tradition, the giving of the law (matan Torah), is often considered the miracle par excellence. Emil Fackenheim writes: The core of both the Jewish and the Christian faiths is the belief that a God who is other than the world nevertheless enters into the world; that He enters into the world because He enters into the life of man. The Jewish and Christian God descends to meet man, and "a man does not pass, from the moment of supreme meeting, the same being as he entered into it." Judaism and Christianity, or groups within either faith, may differ as to what, more specifically, revelation is; they may also differ as to when it has taken place. But they agree that God can reveal Himself and that, in the entire history of man, He has done so at least once.1 Both Judaism and Christianity profess monotheism. Fackenheim is right in saying that traditional monotheism posits a God who is other than the world. But it is not clear what Fackenheim means when he says that God enters into it. Judaism cannot accept an incarnate God. Thus Cohen maintains that God never reveals Himself in something but to something.2 And the something to which God reveals Himself can only be a human being. It follows that revelation is the relationship which exists between the divine and the human. As early as the twelfth century, Maimonides tried to play down the miraculous nature of this relationship. In his discussion of prophecy (Guide 2.32), he rejects the idea that God can choose anyone at all to be a prophet. Instead he offers what he describes as "the opinion of the Law." This opinion states that prophecy is a perfection of human nature. To be specific, it is the perfection of the rational and imaginative faculties, an overflow from the Agent Intel99 100 JEWISH PHILOSOPHY IN A SECULAR AGE lect that we might describe as a kind of illumination. The nature of the illumination is such that discursive or theoretical knowledge is combined with intuitive: the prophet not only understands an important truth but has a vision of it. I follow Strauss in concluding that the model at work in Maimonides' account of prophecy is that of the escaped prisoner in Plato's cave.3 To the objection that he has made prophecy a natural phenomenon like genius, Maimonides replies that extraordinary mental ability is only a necessary condition for obtaining the rank of prophet. Although God cannot make anyone a prophet, He can deny prophecy to someone who, on mental criteria alone, would be worthy of it. In this way, prophecy involves both extraordinary ability and the concurrence of God. It is well known that Maimonides creates problems for himself by adopting this position.4 What concerns me is the degree to which he has reduced the supernatural component of prophecy to a minimum. If Maimonides is right, the relation between God and the prophet is almost entirely intellectual. The same is true for Kant. We have seen that he is open to the possibility of divine incursions into the normal order of things. He therefore allows for the possibility of external revelation, by which he means revelation through works or words.5 But he points out that external revelation presupposes internal revelation: God's revelation to us through reason. The logic is straightforward. Even if we assume that the earth moves, the sky opens, and a voice is heard, we must ask whether the external revelation so received is really from God. As we saw in the previous chapter, no testimony can insure us that it is. If God is perfect, the only way we can decide whether He is the author of the message is to ask about its content. Is the content consistent with our idea of an autonomous will? We cannot derive our concept of God from the lightning, thunder, and trembling earth. To do so is to succumb to paganism. It is only by thinking of God as a moral agent, as a being worthy of respect, that our concept of Him can represent perfection. It follows that external revelation presupposes consciousness of the moral law. If the voice which addressed us commands acceptable behavior, we can believe it is the voice of God. If not, no amount of thunder and lightning ought to persuade us that we are in...