The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen

Aesthetics, Psychology, and Critical System

7 Aesthetics, Psychology, and Critical System 1. THE AESTHETICS OF PURE FEELING The principle of truth, which I treated in its manifold aspects and meanings in the previous chapter, already endows Cohen's logic and ethics with a systematic character. However, he did not believe that these two branches were sufficient for critical philosophy. His system was planned, like that of Kant, to include logic, ethics, and aesthetics, to which he intended to add a fourth, psychological branch. Though this was his original plan, the last part was never written. We must now turn to the third part, Asthetik des reinen Gefuhls, published in two volumes, in 1912, and also to his remarks on the fourth, psychological part, which can be found in his published works, highlighting those features thatare of interest for the analysis of Cohen's critical philosophy. Mter completing the survey ofthe whole system, certain considerations will be possible on the characteristics of the "critical system" built up by Cohen (ARC 1: 4 passim) . a. Aesthetics and System Throughout Asthetik des reinen Gefuhls, and especially in the first chapter, Cohen emphasizes the systematic character of aesthetics. Actually, this character has at least two, closely connected, though distinct , fundamental meanings. However, Cohen does not insist on the dis131 132 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHYOF HERMANN COHEN tinction between them, tending to move from one to the other, according to the specific context. In one sense, for Cohen, the systematic character of aesthetics means the role of the discipline as the unitary foundation of the arts in the unity of art, while in another, it means the specific, indispensable role of aesthetics in the system of philosophy. As we shall see, the first aspect is linked to the second and, to be more precise , follows it. Nevertheless, each one has its own problems.! Given my general topic, it is certainly more appropriate here to consider aesthetics as a part of the system of critical philosophy. Still, some comment, however brief, needs to be made on the problem of the unitary ground of the arts. Especially in the first chapter of Asthetik des reinen Gefuhls, Cohen argues not only against the opinion that art does not need a ground beyond itself, but also, particularly, against the claim in support of the traditional kind of art history or the more recent "science of art" (with reference to this second trend, Cohen mentions writers such as Semper, W6lfflin, Schmarsow, Fiedler, and, especially, Hildebrand)2 as the unitary foundation of art. He challenges these claims with several arguments , which space does not allow me to elaborate on here (cf. ARC I: 45ff., 56ff.), and concludes that only one philosophical aesthetics can justify the pure, unitary principle that founds the possibility of art, and thus the unity of the arts. But the investigation of the pure ground of art brings aesthetics, by right, into the system of critical philosophy and sets it up as an essential part of it. For this reason, as I mentioned above, only consideration of aesthetics as part of the system of philosophy can justify the claim ofaesthetics to be the systematic foundation of the unity of the arts. h. Aesthetics and the Method ofPurity From the methodological stance, Cohen's aesthetics has some notable differences, which have rightly puzzled his interpreters, as compared with the other parts of his system. The main methodological novelty is the lack of reference to a science, as a fact acting as a starting point for critical investigation. In his previous works, Cohen had frequently insisted that an essential condition for transcendental investigation is the opportunity of referring to a science, from which to start off the investigation of its pure foundation. He had remained faithful to this principle, both in his logic and in his ethics (at least as far as his stated intentions are concerned), developing his investigation, in the first case, with reference to the sciences of nature, through the mediation of mathematics , and in the second, with reference to the moral SCIences, Aesthetics, Psychology, and Critical System 133 through the mediation of the science oflaw. For aesthetics, however, he not only rejected the idea of referring to the "science ofart," in the form in which it had been formulated by his contemporaries, but did not even pose the problem of reference to other possible conceptions of it. This refusal to refer to the fact of a science, as I have...