Israel After Begin

7. Israel in the Middle East

C H A P T E R S E V E N Israel in the Middle East Laurie Mylroie The year 1988 held promise of the resolution of major conflicts throughout the world—in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Namibia, and Angola. Yet no comparable promise of the Arab­Israeli settlement appeared on the horizon, it seemed to have a unique intractability. Still, important changes were seen in the Arab­Israeli arena. In recent years it almost seemed that the conflict had resolved into a tacit undeclared settlement. Israel enjoyed peace with Egypt and a working relationship with Jordan. A highly effective cease­fire kept the quiet along the Syrian­Israeli frontier, while unilateral Israeli action buffered its northern border from Lebanon's turmoil. Indeed, the apparent premise of United States diplomacy after America's own fiasco in Lebanon was to rely on those developments to maintain a minimal goal—stability. Yet, sustained Palestinian unrest, beginning in December 1987, put the lie to any complacency about the stability of an undeclared settlement. The Palestinian uprising spurred new diplomatic efforts, while seemingly thwarting chances of their success and threatening to erode the long­term normalization of Israeli­Arab relations.1 Thus, Israel's position in the Middle East can be understood in terms of two contradictory trends: 1) the quiet normalization of Israeli­ Arab relations; and 2) the continued resistence by some parties to any settlement of the conflict. For, increasingly, the Arab­Israeli conflict is not accurately described as a conflict simply between Arabs and Israelis. After all, Iran is as hostile to Israel as any Arab state. Rather, the conflict, or at least its intractability, is better understood if a distinction is drawn between two kinds of states— 137 Laurie Mylroie 138 ‫״‬ moderate" status quo regimes, and self­styled revolutionary regimes.2 The former—Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and others—have little interest in sustaining the conflict. They tend to seek its resolution and have contributed to the de facto normalization of dealings with Israel. The latter—Syria, Iran, Libya, and other—have every interest in maintaining a state of confrontation with Israel. Their anti­Zionism helps justify their claim to rule and provides a rationale for their ambitions. This phenomenon is not unique to the Middle East, and is better recognized outside the area. For example George Kennan's 1947 ‫״‬ The Sources of Soviet Conduct,‫״‬ which helped shape United States postwar containment policy, explained Soviet foreign policy as a function of domestic politics. The stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its border is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.3 In the Middle East self­styled revolutionary states tend to postulate a Zionist threat ‫״‬ not founded in the realities of foreign antagonism.‫״‬ The perceived threat generates their commitment to maintaining a confrontation with Zionism, while blocking the attempts of others to reach a settlement with Israel. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPO The Normalization of Arab­Israeli Relations and the Erosion of the Periphery Theory The periphery theory, the strategic doctrine of Israel7 s founder, David Ben­Gurion, entailed a view of the Middle East conflict as one between Arabs and Israelis. Fully articulated in the late 1950, s, after the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the periphery theory posited the unceasing enmity of the Arab core. The theory called for alliances with the non­Arab states on the ‫״‬ periphery‫״‬ of the Middle East—Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia—and alliances with the non­Moslem or non­Arab minorities within the Arab states—the Kurds of Iraq, the Maronite Christians of Lebanon, and so on.4 Yet, as will be argued here, the circumstances under which that view was valid have changed in subtle but significant ways. Since the disengagement agreements that followed the 1973 war, there has been a marked erosion of Arab hostility toward Israel. At the same time, new threats to Israel's security have arisen from non­Arab states, while 139 ywvutsrpo Israel in the Middle East some minorities, long considered key elements in the periphery strategy have proven too weak to be useful allies. Israel's situation, and the persistent intractability of the Arab­Israeli conflict, are better understood as the reflection of the ambitions of radical regimes in the region as they pursue an unceasing rivalty with the moderate states...