Conscience at War: The Israeli Soldier as a Moral Critic

10. Criticism in the Making: From Emotion to Cognition

10 Criticism in the Making From Emotion to Cognition Israel's military preparedness rests heavily on the reserve force's availability for deployment in times of emergencies. The reservist's loyalty to this type of service was traditionally ascribed to his moral motivation-his belief in his right and necessity to fight a defensive and just war (Gal 1986). This belief was dramatically shaken for some when the "Peace for the Galilee" campaign was transformed into a war in Lebanon and eventually into an "Israeli Vietnam"; and not long after this when the Israeli reservist was sent to suppress the Intifada-to encounter the "Israeli Algiers." In both of these new types of military conflicts soldiers encountered numerous morally nocwin situations (Inbar 1991). These conflicts gave rise to various forms of criticism, among which selective refusal to serve in the military conflicts was the most extreme and least studied so far. This type of criticism during the Intifada has been the focus of this book. The Intifada refuser has been viewed as a "graduate " of the Lebanon war, even if he was too young to serve there. Even if he did not participate in the Lebanon war, he has been regarded as a reservist who was functioning within the postwar "Lebanonization" process of Israeli SOciety. Assuming that"a way of standing is also a way of seeing or not seeing" (Burke 1965, p. 13), the study of selective refusal to military service has followed two distinct views of criticism, those voiced from a separate perspective and those voiced from a connected perspective of civil disobedience. From the separate position perspective (Kohlberg 1984; Rawls 1971), the moral critic is examined by objective measures and criteria, and the focus lies on the indepen197 198 Conscience at War dent, rational, mature, and consistent modes of moral thinking and action of the critic. From the connected position perspective (Gilligan 1982; Walzer 1988), the moral critic is seen as a unique person searching for a unique way to conceive himself and his position in relation to others; both positions have been studied through indepth interviews. These perspectives, however, do not always correspond to the subjective perception of the moral actor. Even if studied and/or judged from the separate position, the refuser might consider his action as springing from a connected position and vice versa. Table 10 portrays the separate viewpoint on relations between the refusers' moral judgement and action. Table 10. Separate Perspective of Refusal Function Position Cognition Separate (moral stage) II III IV Decision Involvement nonmoral in dilemma factors situation single solution active/ passive courage action (loose connection to unit, loner, commitment to political party, family, and cultural dictates The above table suggests that the emergence of refusal might be seen as being constructed by isolated individuals who rationally and publicly assumed a position from which they believed they would be better judges of the situation. We might interpret this position as springing from their view of the dilemma situation as demanding a linear mode of moral resolution since one of the two opposed actions can be judged as right (Kohlberg and Candee 1984, p. 62). The separate moral critic is required to be obsessed with singling out the most just claim of right as if moral conflicts are always resolvable . The hallmark of this autonomous and mature moral position is the (apparent) nonbiased individualistic outlook of the critic. In a way, this perspective assumes that each individual within a society has the privilege (not only the cognitive ability) of standing outside the system in order to maintain his ideal values of justice. In some Criticism in the Making 199 way, this perspective questions the possibility of the Israeli SeQ as holding thoughts and actions geared toward the saving or the protecting of lives by means of loyalty to the system of justice. When we looked at the phenomenon of refusal from the connected perspective, we were able to see that even mature moral thinkers were not obsessed with singling out the most right claim of justice . Rather, they were most worried about the position they would assume in the face of an unresolvable moral conflict. Due to their attachment to the system and to some significant (real of imaginary) people within it (such as members of their units, Holocaust victims, etc.), their assuming of the moral position of refusal was a challenge to the socially constructed identity of the Israeli...