Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America

1. Explaining Rivalry and Rapprochement in Cold War Latin America

c h a p t e r o n e Explaining Rivalry and Rapprochement in Cold War Latin America The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry. —Heinrich von Treitschke In England we have come to regard as fellow-citizens between whom there can be no sort of conflict of interest scores of tribes that spent their time mutually throat-cutting at no very distant period, as history goes. We recognize, indeed, that profound national differences like those which exist between the Welshman and the Englishman, or the Scotchman and the Irishman, not only need involve no conflict of interest, but need involve even no separate political existence. —Norman Angell Why do international rivalries persist despite incentives to cooperate, and how can states resolve these conflicts? Conventional wisdom in international relations identifies a common enemy as the most prominent source of cooperation between adversaries, but external threat only rarely delivers lasting reconciliation .1 Why then does a common foe provoke rapprochement between some rivals , but not others, and why do some conflict resolution efforts between allies fail while others succeed? To answer these questions, this book analyzes a series of rivalries in Cold War Latin America and derives broader lessons for alliance politics and conflict resolution. During the Cold War, rivalries within the Western Bloc undermined alliance coordination, particularly in the Americas. The shared threat of Communism and related insurgencies helped some US allies, but not others, to transcend their rivalries with one another. Similar rivalry 2 Rivalry and Alliance Politics dynamics now subvert US coalition-building efforts in the ongoing global struggle against al-Qaeda and its insurgent affiliates. I argue that rivalries frequently persist because of parochial interest within states, not mistrust between them. In particular, the armed forces and other state agencies maintain rivalry to protect their organizational interests in the continued preparation for conflict, defending the status quo by obstructing attempts at major policy change. Rapprochement occurs if two conditions are met in both countries: an alternative mission that assures these agencies continued benefits and state resource constraints that compel tradeoffs among policies. In Cold War Latin America, the combination of leftist insurgency and economic crisis in rival countries created political space for presidents to achieve rapprochement by persuading guardian agencies to abandon rivalry and focus on internal security missions. This argument explains the broad pattern of conflict and cooperation within Cold War Latin America and is directly relevant to persistent rivalries in the Islamic world during the current era of global counterterrorism. This analysis offers some novel and counterintuitive conclusions. First, though necessary, statecraft is overrated. Peacemaking requires neither genius nor sainthood , and rapprochement can fail even when gifted leaders do their utmost to make it work. In contrast, extensive research on conflict resolution and rapprochement emphasizes the importance of costly signaling, symbolic and transformative gestures, and diplomatic engagement.2 In How Enemies Become Friends, Charles Kupchan argues that carefully orchestrated gestures of self-restraint and reciprocal accommodation are essential to break out of mistrust and rivalry .3 However, I show that these efforts often fail and that the obstacle to cooperation is more often the interests of the bureaucracy than the diplomatic shortcomings of leaders. Second, the drivers of protracted conflict often involve greed rather than grievance, and the state rather than society. This contrasts with the majority of research on protracted conflicts, which emphasizes ideational factors like identity, culture, and social learning.4 Third, and relatedly, aid to allies is often counterproductive, reinforcing rather than undermining existing rivalries . This speaks directly to current policy debates, since US coalition-building efforts involve calls for ever more military assistance. Fourth, Latin American “dirty wars” had silver linings: by creating a new vested interest for the armed forces, they opened the door to international rapprochement. This contrasts with studies that attribute Latin American peacemaking primarily to democratic and neoliberal governments.5 Finally, to proponents of several international relations perspectives, the book offers uncomfortable observations. Realists have to contend with systematic bureaucratic obstruction of the national interest, construc- Explaining Rivalry and Rapprochement in Cold War Latin America 3 tivists with political actors’ response to incentives rather than ideas, and liberals with the apparent insignificance of regime type...