Why Mars: NASA and the Politics of Space Exploration

Chapter Twelve. Attempting Alliance

chapter twelve Attempting Alliance On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama became president, and Congress tilted more dramatically in the Democrats’ favor than was the case under Bush. With economic crisis at home and wars abroad, Obama had many priorities. Space policy did not appear to rank high on his agenda, although he extolled Apollo as an inspirational event. Obama’s style was consensual, and he conferred with various senators, especially Bill Nelson (D-FL), in choosing a NASA Administrator . It took him a while to find someone. As the Obama transition got under way in the early months of 2009, and as he waited for a new NASA Administrator to take command, Weiler plunged ahead with his own agenda.1 He had two immediate Mars tasks: one was to reconstitute the Mars Science Laboratory for the next two years, and the other was to develop a robust program for the years after MSL which would get to the long-sought goal of Mars Sample Return. As far as he was concerned, he had inherited no real program beyond MSL. He had problems financially, in part because of MSL and its overruns. But he also saw opportunity if he and the European Space Agency’s Southwood could mount an effort to Mars together. The challenge was to get NASA and the new administration to commit to a long-term program. He and NASA needed a multimission successor as the existing Mars Exploration Program ran its course. The bilateral effort seemed a “win-win” for the United States and Europe. But NASA and ESA were trying 226 Why Mars to sell this big science program at a time when resources on both sides of the Atlantic were hard to obtain. What worked internationally depended—at least for NASA—on what transpired domestically. Domestically, the space policy subsystem would face upheaval due to the impact of presidential and congressional political struggle. The larger conflicts in Washington were mainly about human spaceflight and overall budgets. But robotic Mars policy could not be protected from these macro events. Reconstituting MSL Weiler’s first task was to consider any changes in managing MSL, delayed two years. Naderi, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars director, had been succeeded a few years earlier by Fuk Li. The consensus in NASA was that Li was hamstrung in overseeing MSL by Stern.2 Indeed, JPL and the Mars science community pointed fingers at Stern for many of MSL’s problems. The consequence was that the only significant personnel change Weiler made was to move the JPL project manager, Cook, to a deputy slot. Pete Theisinger, the project manager for Spirit and Opportunity, and one of JPL’s most respected managers, was put in charge. The fact that Cook remained attested to the fact that NASA and JPL held him in high regard and believed that his expertise was essential. But NASA leaders also wanted to show Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and others that it would not tolerate cost overruns.3 Cook soon developed a plan for Theisinger, JPL, and NASA showing how the various technical issues that had led to delay could be mitigated. The plan was approved up the line, and additional organizational and personnel adjustments made. Then, JPL got to work in making the technical improvements. Actuators were the prime culprit, but so also were avionics, sampling instruments , and other technologies. As Cook reflected in a paper he subsequently wrote, “As the project got bigger and more complex, the problems grew not linearly, but geometrically.”4 It was not long before NASA and JPL began feeling fortunate that the decision to delay was made. But the cost increases in MSL went beyond the $400 million calculated at the time the decision was announced in December 2008. Soon MSL was up to $2.5 billion in total costs. The good news was that some of MSL’s harshest critics, such as Lee at JPL, were seeing MSL as viable for a 2011 launch.5 As Weiler saw the prospects of MSL improve, he put more money into the Mars program. He tried to replenish it after years of cutbacks. But he needed Attempting Alliance 227 to plan for the post-MSL future and how to pay for it. He saw a Mars Together strategy as imperative. Mars Together with ESA Weiler and Southwood were old friends who had been talking about collaboration...