The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations

5: How Does Peacekeeping Socialize the Military in Haiti?

An in-depth analysis of MINUSTAH helps us consider how peacekeeping missions socialize troops. The mission has a complex set of mandates that combine peace observation, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, and even refugee assistance.1 Its complexity helps illustrate that peacekeeping is not a onedimensional activity and that it can have multiple effects on the socialization of ground troops. Also, MINUSTAH brings together contingents from Argentina , Brazil, Uruguay, and other democratizing states. Not only are these the largest troop-lending countries to Haiti, MINUSTAH is the mission to which they deploy their largest national contingents in the UN system (table 5.1). MINUSTAH represents a critical juncture for South American geopolitics and diplomacy. According to Raúl Benítez, the mission “grants Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay a position in the region as guarantors of security” (qtd. in Kenkel 2010a, 592). Given this reality, one might assume that the mission would promote policy convergence between these four states as a result of their common interaction in the UN framework and in Haiti. In fact, there is limited quantitative and qualitative evidence of this trend. The mission’s influence upon the various peacekeepers in terms of civilian integration and professionalism varies hugely, leading to policy divergence. From a methodological perspective, and in order to establish a more threedimensional picture of the socializing effect of peacekeeping missions, this chapter seeks to answer three main questions: Where did the peacekeepers go? What type of peacekeeping functions did they perform? How did their experience influence domestic moves toward civilian integration and military professionalism , if at all? To answer these questions, I rely on a number of primary and secondary sources. I refer to the findings of field research trips conducted 5 How Does Peacekeeping Socialize the Military in Haiti? 128 The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper in Argentina and Brazil in 2009, and at UN Headquarters in New York and Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in 2010. These field trips allowed me to monitor recent peacekeeping trends and to observe the blue helmets in the field. In addition to visiting the mission headquarters, I also paid a visit to three international displaced persons (IDP) camps and Cité Soleil (a slum in the heart of the capital). Here the blue helmets provided a number of services ranging from control checks to public security and refugee assistance. I also conducted confidential interviews with a variety of nonmilitary actors, including civilian staff and NGO representatives. This chapter begins with some background information about MINUSTAH. It then compares the impacts of the mission on troop contingents from the three countries under study. MINUSTAH: Background The UN has been active in Haiti since 1990, when it launched the UN Observer Group for Verification of Elections in Haiti, followed by a multinational force led by the United States to depose a military junta in 1993, and a peacebuilding mission to facilitate the return of a legitimately elected, civilian government in 1994 (UNMIH). Throughout this period, the UN was relatively successful in its efforts to oust the military and to return Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide, a former Catholic priest who led the pro-democracy movement, became Haiti’s first elected president in 1991. He served two terms as chief executive between 1994 and 1996, and again between 2001 and 2004.2 In February 2004, violence re-erupted, however, first in the city of Gonaïves, where an anti-Aristide rebel force (the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front) emerged, and then in Port-au-Prince, where armed gangs terrorized the local population and drove away the police. Shortly after the outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince, the United States persuaded President Aristide to go into exile in South Africa. In an attempt to secure the country and to put an end to an escalating civil conflict between Aristide’s supporters and his opponents, the UN Security Council authorized a three-month multinational interim force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.3 U.S. marines as well as French, Canadian, and Chilean troops who were all heavily armed initially comprised the force. Yet the growing controversy over Washington’s role in the Aristide affair prompted the UN to adopt a broader mandate in an effort to ensure a more balanced international presence in Haiti (Weiner and Polgree 2004). How Does Peacekeeping Socialize the Military in Haiti? 129 MINUSTAH was created in April 2004 with a complex mandate that included reforming...