In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Failed Counteroffensive Chapter Four Both the British and American leadership recognized that the critical North American strategic objective was the St. Lawrence lifeline to the lakes. British leadership saw the Midwestern natives as allies that might divert American military efforts away from this vital point. Thus the Indians found a willing ally in the British, but the lifeline between the St. Lawrence Valley and the Great Lakes was long and tenuous, and its disruption made military assistance difficult to obtain. Moreover, Canadian officials correctly concentrated their military assets in preserving the St. Lawrence line rather than focusing on the Great Lakes, particularly the upper lakes. So natives fought their war for cultural survival with only modest British military assistance and with promises of continued support that were subject to the whims of His Majesty’s government ’s imperial interests. Besides British naval dominance on the lakes, two key locations were vital to the maintenance or disruption of British military support and commercial intercourse between the Midwest and Montreal: Detroit and Michilimackinac . Detroit controlled the sailing vessel route between Lake Huron and Lake Erie, the most convenient and rapid way for the exchange of goods and military materiel between the Niagara portage and the upper lakes. Michilimackinac was the center of trade and communication between Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior and the vast interior of lakes, rivers, and forests that stretched beyond the Mississippi. Three agents of British imperialism became essential ingredients in renewing British-Indian ties in the early nineteenth century: Isaac Brock (1769– 1812), commanding general of British troops in Upper Canada and president of the Executive Council of the province; Robert Dickson (1765?–1823), a fur trader headquartered at Green Bay; and Matthew Elliott (1739?–1814), a British Indian agent operating out of Amherstburg.1 Major General Brock wanted to conduct offensive operations should there be an outbreak of warfare. This was particularly necessary because he relied The Failed Counteroffensive 97 on Native Americans, not only of his province but also of the Old Northwest, to stop any American invasion. In December 1811 he wrote Governor General Sir George Prevost that “before we can expect an active cooperation on the part of the Indians” we must capture Michilimackinac and Detroit. He believed such an achievement would encourage the natives to join with the British and encourage Canadian settlers to reconsider the possible success of their cause. Brock recognized that to protect their frontier from Indian depredations , the Americans would have to deploy troops across the Great Lakes region—troops that could not be used against critical Canadian targets. Unless this western diversion were instigated, he expected “an overwhelming force” to be sent against the Lake Ontario littoral and the St. Lawrence Valley. The Americans, he observed, were “an enterprising hardy race, and uncommonly expert on horseback with the rifle.”2 That capability might eventually spell the doom of the British military in the Midwest, but initial success in the western theater refocused American military effort in the secondary theater of the Upper Lakes rather than in the more critical Lake Ontario–St. Lawrence theater . Brock astutely evaluated the strategic consequences of undertaking offensive operations in the West. Subsequent events proved him eminently correct. Brock also recognized the criticality of naval dominance on the Great Lakes: since no overland transportation net existed to support ground operations, naval superiority was essential to the protection of the Canadian shore from American invasion. Lake Erie was particularly vulnerable; “From Amherstburgh to Fort Erie,” he noted, “my chief dependence must rest on a naval force for the protection of that extensive coast.” He instituted cooperation between the provincial marine forces and the North West Company and its lightly armed vessels to combat the Americans’ ground mobility and numerical superiority . But the provincial marine and fur traders were a slender reed on which to base a naval strategy.3 By aggressively attacking the weak upper Great Lakes frontier before the Americans were ready to focus on the decisive strategic targets, Brock envisioned an economy-of-force measure designed to use Native Americans, fur traders and their employees, and small contingents of British regulars and Canadian militiamen to divert the Americans from concentrating on the strategic lifeline of Upper Canada. Few generals have done so much with so few while at the same time placing at risk so many who stood to lose all should the Americans retain the line-of-lakes boundary negotiated in 1783. Today Robert Dickson is virtually forgotten, but...

Share