Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama

Index

index ACDA. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, 15–20, 39, 252n11, 252n13; defensive advantage and, 17; international inspection and, 18; security dilemma and, 15–19; Soviet Union and, 19–20, 252n15 AD. See Assured Destruction Adelman, Kenneth, 139; on Soviet intent, 169 Agnew, Spiro, 85 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 84–85; Clinton and, 228; defensive strategies and, 145–148, 262n19; evaluating strength and, 154–163; exotic technologies and, 145; Nunn and, 173; policy debate and, 145–148; Reagan and, 133; relative advantage and, 86; Soviet buildup and, 87; Soviet commitment to arms control and, 119–120; Soviet defensive advantages and, 87; Soviet violations and, 139, 261n8; Standing Consultative Commission and, 82–83, 108, 112–113; Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) and, 143–145, 262n22; supporters vs. critics and, 86–88; testing and, 264n5; trust and verification and, 89, 154–163, 163–169, 220–224; U.S defense and, 87–89; U.S. withdrawal from, 206–208; “zero-zero” formula and, 86–89. See also speci fic weapons and systems arms control, logic of U.S. approach to, 1–2 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 78, 122; MIRV limitations and, 257n12 Assured Destruction (AD), 34, 76, 77, 81, 93, 101, 110, 138, 230, 247, 258n37; Cheney and, 193; cost and, 69; deterrence and, 119; mirror imaging and, 136–137; missile defense systems and, 147; reasoning flaws and, 68–71; retaliatory strike and, 118; war-fighting goals and, 130–131; war-supporting industry and, 69 Atomic Development Authority, 20 Atoms for Peace, 27–29, 36, 234, 254nn28–30; fissile material and, 27–29, 238; horizontal (proliferation) problem and, 29; inconsistencies of, 28–29; nuclear proliferation and, 39; relative advantage and, 29, 238; Soviets response to, 29; strategic costs and, 29; vertical (accumulation) problem and, 29 Aviation Week, 110 B-1 bombers, 264n58; Carter and, 242; Interim Agreement (SALT I) and, 122; program cancellation and, 123, 242; START I ceiling and, 201; START II Treaty and, 201 B-2 bombers, 134, 175–176, 183, 200; START treaties and, 200 B-52 bombers, 96, 97, 115, 134, 183, 258n32, 266n25 Backfire bombers, 96, 97, 114–115 Baker, James, 191–192, 225 Baruch, Bernard, 12, 15; Baruch Plan, Soviet reaction to, 19–20, 252n12; collective security and, 19 beliefs, assessments of strength and vulnerability and, 6 Biden, Joseph, 211 Bikini Atoll, 32 Blacker, Coit, 137 Brezhnev, Leonid, 74, 89; Brezhnev Doctrine and, 183 282 Index Broscius, S. David, 10 Brown, Harold, 73, 101, 102, 108, 123, 160, 264n47; on AD, 258n37; cheating, use of multiple detection sources, and, 107–108; “countervailing” strategy and, 73; on detection limits, 111; “essential equivalence” and, 73; on mobile missiles, 259n41; on psychological balance, 93–94 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 123 Buckley, James, 145 Burt, Richard, 160, 262n30 Bush, G. H. W., 182–186; Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar Initiative ), 183–184; end of the Cold War and, 183; post–Cold War Russia and, 183–184; START I Treaty and, 182 Bush, G. W., 205–211; on Antiballistic Missile Treaty withdrawal, 206–207; arms control efforts of, 230; defense advocates and, 206–207; Moscow Treaty and, 229; nuclear options, doctrinal pretenses, and, 241; politics , nuclear policy, and, 243; preemption and, 206; reassessing arms control and, 205–206; September 11 attacks and, 205–206 Byrnes, James, 14 capability balance, 254n30 Carlucci, Frank, 170, 171, 263n39 Carter, 72–73, 89; “escalation dominance” and, 72; European missile deployment and, 158–159; MX missile and, 134; nuclear policy, politics, and, 242; SALT II in the Senate and, 122; SALT II Treaty and, 235, 239–240, 242; Soviet behavior and, 120. See also SALT II Treaty Chayes, Abram, 248 Chayes, Antonia Handler, 248 Cheney, Richard, 183, 184–185, 225; AD doctrine and, 193; on nondeployed missiles, 263n16; on Russian cheating, 193; U.S. targeting review and, 184–186; on war-fighting, 263n17 China, 54; atmospheric testing and, 256n15; Clinton and, 197; SIOP and, 25 Churchill, Winston, 12 Clinton, 197–199; composite of AD and warfighting principles and, 241; NATO expansion and, 226; nuclear weapons policy and, 197–198; politics, nuclear policy, and, 242 Clinton, Hillary, 211, 216; on offense vs. defense, 217 Cold War, 227; end of, 182; hawks and, 237; politics of arms control and, 227–229; underlying logical tensions and, 241 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 206, 266n30 compellence vs. deterrence, 12, 14, 252n9 comprehensive test ban: 1996 Treaty and, 197, 211, 213, 228; Eisenhower and, 38–39; Kennedy and, 234; McNamara on...