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chapter three War and Peace Coordinating Naval Forces A leader in planning a campaign or a battle thinks in terms of the limitations imposed by the ranges and arcs of train of his guns, of the speed of his ships, and the capacity of his bunkers. He must learn to think in terms of the limitations of his communications system too. These limitations are definite and any plans that overtax the system are destined to failure. He must know exactly what he can and cannot do. Harold W. Boynton, 1926 Like Hell Let Loose On the afternoon of 31 May 1916, Admiral John Jellicoe stood impatiently on his flagship, HMS Iron Duke, awaiting information. Under his command were more than 150 vessels, among them dozens of the world’s most powerful warships. At around half past two, the admiral received an enemy contact report transmitted via wireless telegraph by HMS Galatea. He immediately ordered his ships to generate steam for full speed and to prepare for action. Over the next two hours, Jellicoe received additional wireless reports from several of his subordinate commanders, many of whom reported that they were engaging the enemy. Until roughly half past four the admiral believed he was facing only a portion of the German High Seas Fleet, as shore-based personnel previously had sent him an intelligence message placing the German fleet’s flagship in port. Abruptly, at 4:38 p.m., a British cruiser reported the enemy battle fleet in sight. Jellicoe received two more contact reports over the next ten minutes. Then nothing. For nearly an hour, the commander-inchief of the British Grand Fleet received no new information. On board Iron Duke, Jellicoe’s staff kept a plot of the tactical picture, a bird’s-eye view of the ocean’s surface with pencil marks denoting own and opposing forces. But just how accurate was that tactical picture? Describing events after the war, Jellicoe recounted his frustrations: 82 Information at Sea The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs . . . was timed 5.40 p.m., but received by me considerably later . . . At about 5.50 p.m. I received a wireless signal . . . reporting having sighted ships in action . . . There was, however, no clue as to the identity of these ships . . . The information so far received had not even been sufficient to justify me in altering the bearing of the guides . . . At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet.1 As six o’clock arrived and darkness approached, Iron Duke came into contact with HMS Lion, flagship of the British battle cruiser force. At first, Jellicoe was confused. According to the plot, Lion should have been twelve miles straight ahead. Yet there Lion was, on Iron Duke’s starboard quarter, less than six miles away. Jellicoe’s flagship signaled by searchlight to inquire: “Where is the enemy battle fleet?” After receiving an inadequate response, he repeated the inquiry, allegedly commenting to his staff: “I wish someone would tell me who is firing and what they are firing at.” Not until 6:14 p.m. did Jellicoe receive an answer from Lion that enabled him to act: “Have sighted enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west.”2 The frustration created by problematic communications during this naval battle, known to posterity as Jutland, was not limited to the fleet’s highestranking officer. Aboard Galatea, the ship’s leading telegraphist was also having a devil of a time. As he later described events: I shall never forget what it was like with those earphones on. Pandemonium . . . I had to report naturally every signal received. The Germans’ wireless transmitters were by telefunken, which all had a very high frequency note. It sounded as though all the Germans were transmitting at the same time. Also were all our own ships transmitting enemy reports dozens of times. At the same time the iron duke was making manoeuvering messages every minute to the fleet. It was like hell let loose.3 These anecdotes offer but two examples of the command and control dif- ficulties encountered by British naval personnel during the Battle of Jutland (31 May–1 June 1916). Of the methods then available for ship-to-ship communications , only wireless telegraphy permitted reliable communications beyond the horizon, and neither British nor German personnel possessed particularly effective systems for managing the information obtained through radio. In the case of the Royal Navy, inaccurate or...

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