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chapter 3 From Ronald Reagan through Barack Obama A lot of people believed that the military is eager to go out and shoot somebody, or that it should be; that’s what they expect from the military. The modern military is not like that at all. In my experience, the civilians in the government were more eager to go shoot somebody than was the military. admiral william crowe jr. Despite continued policy differences and a sometimes rocky relationship, civil-military relations saw the emergence of shared responsibility in a number of cases, in particular under Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Differences of opinion under these administrations were worked out in a congenial, if sometimes energetic fashion. Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) When Reagan came into office he did so on a promise to restore military morale by offering the armed forces the respect they had enjoyed in the past. In addition, he made it clear from the beginning that he would provide the armed forces with the needed money to rebuild and modernize their forces. Given the devastating impact of the Vietnam War on military equipment and installations, and Carter’s attempts to starve them, such talk was welcome. When it came to dealing with Reagan, the Joint Chiefs were of two minds. On the one hand, he was publicly supportive of them. On the other, working with him could be difficult. His lack of precision created havoc in the Pentagon . But in contrast to some past presidents, Reagan listened to the Joint Chiefs. Overall, the Joint Chiefs were particularly appreciative of his willingness to pour millions of dollars into rebuilding the military. Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, was also very promilitary and prepared to spend whatever was necessary to reequip the armed From Ronald Reagan through Barack Obama 43 forces with modern weapons. Weinberger, however, often thought he understood military matters as well as or better than the generals. At his first meeting with them on January 15, 1981, after shaking hands with the Joint Chiefs, he surprised them by explaining the Reagan administration’s defense policies. Just before the meeting was adjourned, Weinberger made a suggestion. “Since we are required to remedy our vulnerability in the strategic area . . . I suggest we resolve the MX basing debate and vulnerability of the rest of our ICBM force here and now.” The Joint Chiefs and their deputies were stunned. One does not normally solve an incredibly complex question such as a basing mode for the MX in a few minutes. Weinberger suggested that the United States should put MX missiles on “ships.” “The room became dead silent. The Air Force’s Lew Allen turned to face Jones, his hand over his mouth, his eyebrows up, questioning. . . . No one seemed more surprised than CNO Hayward, who looked straight at Weinberger in apparent disbelief, his jaw slack.” Weinberger broke the silence by asking if anyone at the table supported his great idea. The room remained silent. All eyes focused on General Jones. In what must go down as one of the more courageous acts of Jones’s career, he “looked straight at Weinberger and said, ‘Well, I think that is the kind of idea that Reader’s Digest would like.’ ” Everyone was stunned. “Weinberger stared at Jones, his anger apparent. ‘That happens to be where I get my medical advice,’ he said and got up and stomped out of the room.”1 Senior Canadian, German, and Russian military officers are not the only ones who have had to deal with defense ministers who often know little about military matters. The lesson was simple: humor the secretary when he makes military suggestions . At the same time praise him for the vast sums he is bringing into the Department of Defense. This was not an especially positive beginning to the creation of a period of shared responsibility. The secretary and the president were convinced that the U.S. lagged behind the Soviet Union, and that spelled serious problems for the West. To quote Reagan: Pentagon leaders told me appalling stories of how the Soviets were gaining on us militarily, both in nuclear and conventional forces; they were spending fifty per cent more each year on weapons than we were; meanwhile in our armed forces, the paychecks are so small that some married enlisted men and women were eligible for welfare benefits; many military personnel were so ashamed of being in the service that as soon as they left their posts...

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