Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study

1. A Conceptual Framework for Shared Responsibility

chapter 1 A Conceptual Framework for Shared Responsibility Military Service stands by itself; it has some of the qualities of a priesthood , a professional civil servant; of a great bureaucratized business organization and an academic order. . . . It has something of each of these in it but it corresponds to none. walter mills The primary focus of the study of civil-military relations in established, mature, stable polities should not be political control, for political control in such systems is usually a given: officers in all four armies discussed in this book—Germany, Canada, Russia, and the U.S.—took an oath recognizing civilian supremacy. A more useful approach to understanding this special relationship is to focus on the process and not assume a battle between two dichotomous , potentially hostile entities. The uniformed military can be of considerable use to civilian elites in dealing with security issues, provided its views are respected, and senior military officers can provide honest advice without fear of career or personal reprisals. In such a relationship, civilian authorities respect the military and are interested in hearing what senior officers have to say about national security affairs. However, everyone concerned understands that civilian authorities make the final decisions. In this book, I argue that conflict in the relationship between the civilian and the military is normal, positive, and healthy, provided it is regulated.1 Give-and-take is at the heart of civil-military relations. Conflict is ubiquitous: it is the engine that drives the national security decision-making process, provided there is mutual respect. Focus, thus, should be on the nature of interactions between the military and its civilian masters. The key to healthy relations is to create and maintain a good working relationship between the two sides, one that is constructive and in which both sides respect each other. 2 Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility The Nature of Conflict The relationship between officers and civilian politicians is marked by con- flict, in part because every military budget is finite. In the countries discussed here, it is up to the executive, usually in the form of a department of the treasury , to recommend how much of the country’s funds to spend and on what. Admirals always think they need more expensive ships, and Marine generals want more and better equipment and weapons. The air force would spend most of the budget on new, faster stealth aircraft or more advanced missiles. And since it bears the brunt of fighting in areas like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, the army believes the majority of the budget should be spent on conventional forces. Deciding which countries have a realistic chance of building a constructive working relationship between the civil and the military is subjective. This framework of mutual respect is of no value in the study of countries in which the military is in charge of the political process; it only applies where the military is subordinate to civilian control, and yet the civilian leaders are interested in working with the military. Soldiers and Civilians If conflict is inevitable, how should it be managed? One suggestion comes from Sam Huntington in his seminal work The Soldier and the State (1957),2 in which he argues that strategy and military operations should be separated from policy.3 Politicians should determine the country’s policy and goals, while the military professionals implement their orders. The two factions live in separate worlds. A senior military officer may advise but not become involved in policy making. It is the task of a military professional to learn the mechanics of war and to train the troops so they can carry out missions assigned by the civilian leadership. As Huntington put it, the primary task for the professional military officer is “the direct operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence.”4 Because the nature of war has become so technically complex, military specialists are needed in the application of these new deadly forms of violence. Only military leaders know how much force to use and when and how to apply it. If civilians become involved—as is their right—they may undermine the entire operation, since they may not understand either the weapons systems or how to best utilize them in carrying out the mission.5 Some scholars agree with Huntington in his attempt to draw a clear line A...