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Notes chapter 1. A Conceptual Framework for Shared Responsibility 1. See, for example, the discussion of the surge in Iraq as presented in Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), which displays an open give-andtake between senior military officers and civilians. In fact, not all civilians are on one side, nor are all military officers. 2. Sam Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). 3. For an excellent discussion of the problems involved in separating policy from operations, see Frank G. Hoffman, “Dereliction of Duty Redux? Post-Iraq American CivilMilitary Relations,” Orbis 52, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 219. 4. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11. 5. For an updated view of Huntington’s relevance today, see Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). One of the best critiques of Huntington ’s model is Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz , and the Problem of Civil-Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 149–78. 6. Michael Desch, “Soldiers, States and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (Spring 1998): 391. He repeats this approach in his book-length study of civil-military relations, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 3–6. 7. Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Its Limits,” Armed Forces and Society 19, no.1 (Fall 1992): 9. 8. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 5; Richard Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Naval War College Review (Summer, 2002), http://findarticles.com/ p/articles/mi_m0jiW/is92745784/print. 9. For an essay arguing the critical importance of “influence” see Kobi Michael, “The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 33, no. 4 (2007): 518–46. See also Peter Feaver, “The Right to Be Right,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 87–125. 10. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American CivilMilitary Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1–5. As they state, “Military officer respondents report what they called a ‘realpolitik’ approach 296 Notes to Pages 4–7 to the issue, one that reserves the use of force for interstate issues that represent a substantial threat to national security such as control of territory, the maintenance of geostrategic access and positions, and the defense of allies” (5–6). See also Deborah Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 384. She notes that “what most critics complain about in today’s American civil-military relationship is precisely the opposite—that the military is too selflimiting , both in the use of force and in its engagement in activities other than war.” 11. Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process,” Armed Forces and Society 25, no. 2 (Winter, 1999): 195. 12. Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil-Military Relations,” 383. 13. Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Political Power, US/USSR (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). 14. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military. 15. Desch, “Soldiers, States and Structures,” 390. 16. Compare, for example, Desch’s discussion of the Russian experience with this writer’s The Kremlin and the High Command (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). The Russian military was far less of an internal threat to political control than Desch’s study indicated, in fact, it was in a state bordering on chaos given Yeltsin’s lack of leadership and respect for the military. 17. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 18. Rebecca Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of CivilMilitary Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009). 19. Ibid. 20. Douglas Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 6, 18, 19, and 20 discussed in text. 21. Ibid., 10. 22. Ibid., 19. Emphasis in the original. 23. Edwin Dorn, Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, and T...

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