Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study

7. From Brian Mulroney through Stephen Harper

chapter 7 From Brian Mulroney through Stephen Harper In Canada over the years it appears that the politics of defence matters more than national defence itself. douglas bland After fifteen years of the antimilitary Pierre Trudeau and the machinations of Defence Minister Paul Hellyer, the Canadian military was hopeful that the newly elected Conservative Brian Mulroney would be more supportive . At least, the armed forces believed he could not be worse than Trudeau or Hellyer had been. He was making some positive comments about the importance of the Canadian Forces. Perhaps he would see the value of a modern , well-equipped, combat-ready Canadian Forces. Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservatives (1984–1993) Brian Mulroney and the Conservatives took power on September 17, 1984, after the three-month reign of John Turner, the shortest in Canadian history since 1896. The military’s first disappointment came with Mulroney’s choice of a defence minister, Robert Coates, “a lackluster Nova Scotia MP whose only claim to preferment was his opposition to the previous conservative leader, Joe Clark.”1 Coates was deeply suspicious of the department, and within a few weeks he and his personal staff were fighting with other officials in the department—both military and civilian. Canada was at least five years behind the rest of the West. Although the Mulroney government wanted Canada to play a more active role, the neglect of the military during the 1970s made this almost impossible. When the Trudeau government took over in 1980, it destroyed the entire print run of Canada in a Changing World; the only way Canadians could access it was through the one copy that was read into Hansard. Ironically, it was to form the basis of Mulroney’s foreign policy—rejecting the liberal stance and taking a From Brian Mulroney through Stephen Harper 177 more realistic two-fisted approach. In contrast to the Trudeau approach, the key area of concern was Europe, where: “a formidable, conventional and nuclear adversary” and indeed “the most direct threat to Canadian security [was] derived both from the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and antipathy to Canadian values.” Outside Europe, “the main problem areas were Afghanistan, Poland, the SS-20 deployment, and human-rights violations in Warsaw Pact countries. . . . Notably, international terrorism was examined as a threat to Canadian interests.”2 THE 1987 WHITE PAPER The Mulroney government wanted to come up with a long-term plan that would reinvigorate the CF in terms of money, equipment, personnel, and morale. Reform began in 1985, and within three months a white paper was issued, the first since 1971, entitled, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. In this document, care was taken to separate foreign and defence policy. The goal of the latter was to compliment diplomatic, economic, and cultural policies. If Canada hoped to exert influence in Europe as well as the U.S., then it had to be a reliable military partner. During the Trudeau years, Canadian credibility abroad had eroded. To turn things around, “The Canadian government had to re-establish the neglected armed forces; it was immoral to commit units like the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade in support of NATO without adequate resources.”3 The white paper outlined a 15-year plan. “All elements of the Canadian Forces are to augment existing capabilities. Priority will be given to three clusters of military activity such as the maritime forces, surveillance and control capabilities, and the reserve forces.”4 Structurally, the document argued that NATO and NORAD were key organizations in which Canada needed to have credible military forces. It was critical that Canada be in a position to help defend against Soviet strategic attacks, which could best be done through Canada ’s association with NORAD and its forces in Europe. To implement this white paper, Canada’s continental forces had to be upgraded—that is, maritime patrol aircraft, fighters, and surveillance capabilities . The Arctic was also important because of Moscow’s undersea capabilities . Toward that end, “Canadian naval forces would be modernized with SSNs and some twenty-four Canadian patrol frigates equipped for ‘Three Ocean operations.’ In addition, Ottawa’s CF-18s would have to have forward operating bases in the Arctic.”5 The most controversial issue was the construc- 178 Canada tion of nuclear submarines. One fear in dealing with the civilian leadership was that External Affairs Minister Joe Clark did not understand the differences between...