Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes

Contents

Contents Acknowledgments ix Acronyms and Abbreviations xiii 1 Military Mission Performance in Latin America 1 Challenges to Security and Democratic Civil-Military Relations in the Andes 3 Explaining Military Mission Performance in Democratic Latin America 5 Case Selection: A Focus on the Army in Peru and Ecuador 18 The Data 20 Overview of the Analysis 20 2 Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Peru and Ecuador 23 High Constraints on Peru’s Military 24 Low Constraints on Ecuador’s Military 30 3 Army Mission Performance in Post-Transition Peru and Ecuador, 1980s–1990s 37 Sovereignty before Policing 37 Deviations: Contradictions in Missions and Sovereignty Neglect 50 Alternative Explanations 56 4 Mission Constraint and Neglect of Counterinsurgency: Peru since 2000 58 Staying in the Barracks 58 Insecurity in Sendero Zones 59 Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses 64 Army Inaction 73 Restrictions on Army Autonomy 83 Contradiction through Mission Constraint 83 The Source of the Senior Cohort’s “Need” for Autonomy 92 Neglect of Counterinsurgency as a Way to Maintain Predictability for Patrols 97 viii Contents Return to Assertive Counterinsurgency 102 Narrow Mission Beliefs and Minimal Police Work 105 5 Mission Overload and Neglect of Border Defense: Ecuador since 2000 115 Neglecting a Porous Border while Policing the Interior 116 Insecurity in Northern Ecuador 116 Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses 124 Assertive Policing 133 Overwhelming Security Responsibilities 140 Policing to Avoid Obsolescence 140 Contradiction through Mission Overload 150 Managing the Contradiction 155 The Contradiction Escalates 157 Alternative Explanations: Revisiting Legitimacy 161 6 Battalions for Hire: Private Army Contracts in Peru and Ecuador 165 Resource-Hungry Army Units 166 Local Client Influence 168 Limits to Client Influence 181 7 Comparative Perspectives on Military Mission Performance 184 Colombia: Tolerance of Policing amid Ongoing Insurgency 185 Venezuela: Mission Loss, Organizational Trauma, and Rejection of Police Work 194 Bolivia: Policing despite Organizational Trauma 198 Extreme Executive Control: Trends in Venezuela and Bolivia 202 Reflections on Assigning Militaries to Conduct Police Work 205 Appendix. Field Research Methodology 207 Notes 215 References 249 Index 281 ...