Notes chapter 1. Military Mission Performance in Latin America 1. This treatment of security is, admittedly, narrow in relation to some research in the field of security studies. For limitations to defining the concept of security more broadly, see Paris 2001. 2. In this book, some of the Peruvian army’s work in emergency zones in the 1980s resembles policing, including patrols in towns, home searches, and arrests. This research classifies these tasks as counterinsurgency when they are conducted in emergency zones in the name of fighting the guerrilla threat. 3. For example, see Stepan 1988; Isaacs 1993; F. Agüero 1995b; Norden 1996a; Hunter 1997; Pion-Berlin 1997; Fitch 1998; Loveman 1999; Arceneaux 2001; Weeks 2003; and Trinkunas 2005. 4. Unlike scholarship on Latin American military missions, work on the U.S. military has analyzed military shirking more generally (e.g., Feaver 1998). Given the fundamental differences between the U.S. and Latin American contexts, applying this work to Latin American cases is problematic (Jaskoski 2012a, 72–73). 5. This framing of mission neglect as push-back against challenges to the military ’s autonomy, along with select, related details for the Peruvian case in the post2000 period (in chapters 2 and 4), is described in Jaskoski 2012a. 6. The vast majority of Latin American countries have been a part of one or more border disputes. Yet, unlike the dynamic in other regions, negotiation or authoritative third-party rulings rather than war have been the main form of dispute settlement in Latin America (Simmons 1999, 5–9). Military clashes that have occurred have mostly been a nineteenth-century phenomenon (Centeno 1997, 1570–73; 2002, 37, 44–47). 7. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, a key player in the Cuban Revolution, “believed that the revolution could only be achieved by destroying the prevailing repressive military-bureaucratic apparatus of Latin America’s capitalist states” (Loveman 1999, 161). See Stepan (1971, 155–58) on concern within Latin American militaries that, as in Cuba, the armed forces would be the first state institution to be sacrificed should communist insurgencies take over government. 8. “Countersubversion” went beyond fighting armed combatants. For instance, the Argentine armed forces—under the civilian government of Isabel Perón (1974–76) 216 Notes to Pages 9–18 and during the brutal military regime of 1976–83—are known for repressing nonviolent individuals purported to support or sympathize with ideologically armed insurgents (Pion-Berlin 1989). 9. On the linkage between Venezuelan officers’ “equity-oriented vision of development ” and this disgruntlement, see also Trinkunas 2002, 46, 51–53. In chapter 7, I discuss in more detail internal factionalism within Venezuela’s armed forces and its ties to the Caracazo repression. 10. I am grateful to J. Samuel Fitch for pointing out this argument. 11. Drawing on role theory, O’Donnell (1973, 79–89) argues that “technocrats” in the private sector and in civilian and military sectors of the state learned “role models ” while studying at schools abroad or at domestic schools shaped by international influences. The clash between these foreign-born, technocratic role conceptions and the social realities of Latin America promoted the formation of coup coalitions between civilian and military technocrats and, ultimately, military authoritarian rule (see also Collier 1979, 27–28). 12. Stepan (1971, 172–87) argued that the military’s changed beliefs about its role were a key cause of the Brazilian military’s 1964 transition from serving as intermittent political moderator to directly ruling government. Dissemination within the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) of new conceptions of national security, development, and the military’s role in politics strengthened officers’ confidence in their capacity to govern, causing them to view military rule as a legitimate form of government. 13. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) coined the name contingency theory (Scott 2003, 96). Since its inception, traditional contingency theory has undergone critiques but has been the main approach to studying organizations (Scott 2003, 97). For a discussion of how contingency theory holds up to challenges from other approaches, see Donaldson 2001, 161–79. 14. Thompson (1967, 10–13), borrowing from Parsons (1960), constructs his conceptualization of organizations as consisting of the technical, managerial, and institutional levels. 15. Thompson’s observation that organizations protect their technical cores from environmental uncertainty has been applied to a wide range of organizations (e.g., Posen 1984, 2004; Fennell and Alexander 1987; Koberg 1988; Demchack 1991; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Brechin 1997; Kamps and Polos 1999; Simon 1999; Sorenson 2003). 16...