Plague, Fear, and Politics in San Francisco's Chinatown

9. National Threat

Is San Francisco Infected? Health Conferences and Railroads The Congressional Act of July 1, 1902, establishing the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, stipulated that the surgeon general call conferences if state and territorial health officials so requested. Because eleven states demanded a meeting to discuss the plague situation in California, Wyman arranged a session for January 19, 1903, in Washington, DC.1 The law required the attendance of one representative from each state health board, creating a dilemma for California: Governor Gage’s current state health board officers had consistently taken a no-plague stand despite all the bacteriological evidence San Francisco and federal health officials had found. Surgeon Arthur H. Glennan , who had replaced Mark J. White at the U.S. Public Health Service’s headquarters in the city, was ordered to negotiate with the new governor of California . He eventually succeeded in getting Mathew Gardner appointed to represent the state. Gardner not only supported the work of the federal government but his prior employment as surgeon-in-chief of the Southern Pacific Railroad also provided him with valuable corporate connections.2 Under Charles F. Crocker, this chapter nine National Threat 1903 The present danger to California and to the United States lies primarily in the persistence, during nearly three years, of a definite nidus of plague infection in that part of San Francisco known as Chinatown. —conference of state boards of health (january 19, 1903) National Threat 219 railroad, dubbed “the octopus” because its tentacles reached into every political and mercantile aspect of California, consolidated its monopoly over freight and passenger traffic into San Francisco and Oakland.3 During the previous year, commerce flourished in San Francisco, endowed with the “finest harbor in the world.” Trade with Asia widened with the establishment of new markets in Hawaii, Philippines, Japan, and China. Local wholesale houses with foreign agents displayed merchandise while American industrial products left the country through the Golden Gate to save cross-country freight costs.4 Although troop movements to and from the Philippines had declined, the federal government continued to sponsor the U.S. Transport Station with its fleet of ships docking at the Folsom Street pier.5 However, Elihu Root, the secretary of war, considered a draft proposal that would empower his department to outsource its chartered transportation business to a private commercial firm. San Francisco, still the home of the Pacific Fleet, was expected to bid successfully for this service, but there was a chance that the contracting firm could recommend a different port for future operations.6 In an article titled “Must Fight to Retain Trade with the Orient,” a local newspaper highlighted efforts by city and port of- ficials in Seattle to intercept and procure commerce with Alaska and Asia traditionally flowing to San Francisco. The latest threat aimed at diverting the bulk of the Asia trade to the Northwest. Indeed, James J. Hill, the railroad tycoon and president of the Northwestern Railway, promised to carry government troops and supplies between Seattle and Manila at reduced rates.7 Following the establishment of Seattle as the railroad’s western terminus in 1893, Hill had worked diligently in association with various steamship companies to make that city’s port a prime hub for imports and exports to Asia. By 1900, Seattle had seen an eightfold expansion of its foreign trade, sending New England cotton, Midwestern grain, and Colorado minerals to China in exchange for tea, silks, and other products.8 By 1901, Hill controlled both the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific Railways, but President Roosevelt ordered the dissolution of this monopoly under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Undaunted, Hill continued to offer highly competitive rates and fast service. Although the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe Railways handled nearly all California’s business, its affiliated steamship companies needed to protect their trade routes and bids on government contracts.9 As the alarm was sounded in San Francisco’s commercial circles, War Department officials announced that it would accept none of the proffered bids. Hill’s proposal actually turned out to be higher than anticipated, but the threat was far from over.10 Many, including 220 Plague Governor George Pardee, suspected that the Northern Pacific Railway had all along encouraged the antiplague behavior of the state health board members, hoping to foster a national outrage against California and a shift in...