American National Security

Foreword

That we now have the publication of the sixth edition of American National Security is testimony not merely to its continuing value as a primer but also to the permanency of the role of the United States as the leading world power. Yet, the permanency of that role should not be taken to suggest the permanency of the challenges that faces the United States. To the contrary, the challenge of National Security is always changing, as over the decades, the world changes. In this connection , it is important to note that the new edition of American National Security has been substantially revised. Twenty years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union itself radically altered the external challenge that had preoccupied the United States over the 40 years of the Cold War. The Cold War had fostered something of an illusion of permanence in that our preeminent concern remained unchanged over many decades, though, nonetheless, the speci fic political and military challenges themselves did undergo continued adjustment . The Soviet collapse, however, implied much more fundamental change. Not only did it mean that the threat to the security of Western Europe—our focus for so many decades—was removed, but it also meant the end of a possible conventional offensive by the Warsaw Pact against Western Europe, which implied that reliance on the nuclear deterrent and on the role of nuclear weapons could be signi ficantly reduced and that the critical position of Europe itself would recede. It also meant that, geostrategically, Europe, if not exactly a backwater, had now become a secondary theater, which implied a major task of making something out of NATO—that was more than an exercise in Alliance nostalgia. Foreword vii It also meant a growing focus on Asia, particularly the rising power of China, as its economic growth and its economic potential rapidly grew. The rise of China and India reflect a substantial and continuing shift that is increasing the prospective power of these rising entities at the general expense of the West. Perhaps even more important is the increasing challenge of the Middle East. Starting with the Iranian Revolution, the United States was suddenly transformed in the view of the Iranian government from a friendly power, if not an ally, into the role of the Great Satan. The defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan meant that the jihadists, initially encouraged by the United States to battle the Soviet Union, refocused the direction of their enmity. The position taken by Osama Bin Laden and others was that their mujaheddin had defeated one superpower inAfghanistan and should now appropriately turn to defeating the other superpower, the United States. This represented a crucial change in our external environment, which we in this country did not fully understand until 9/11. Needless to say, these changes are compounded by the dependence of the United States and, indeed, the outside world on energy supplies from the highly volatile Middle East. A high degree of political instability in the Middle East carries with it a major issue with respect to the formulation of strategy. Such instability is both internal and external. Internally, we may observe shifts in power among various groups— far more significant than any adjustments of party positions in Western democracies . The rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon alters Lebanon’s internal stability as well as creates a more threatening relationship with Israel. In the Palestinian territories, we have witnessed the rise of Hamas in Gaza, which has undermined the previous dominance of the PLO. Both Hezbollah and Hamas are regarded as terrorist groups by the United States government. And, of course, the relative position of various internal groups has undergone continued change with in Iraq, especially since the start of the Surge. Such changes steadily contribute to changing tensions among the states of the region. This continual kaleidoscopic change may make things rather fascinating for the student and the geopolitician, but it makes it quite hard for the strategist. Efforts have been underway in Washington to map out a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East. But, given the ever-changing landscape, such efforts are futile . One cannot develop a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East, because today’s vision is likely to be obsolete tomorrow. Strategy in the Middle East must both assess and adjust to the ongoing changes. In short, like the states of the region themselves, correct strategy must take into account the ever-present probability...