American National Security

5. Congress

5 Congress Over two hundred years ago, Alexander Hamilton laid out the constitutional framers’ rationale for the distinct roles of Congress and the president with these words: “The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; while the execution of the laws, and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate .”1 Their experience during the Revolutionary War convinced the framers that the lack of a strong executive sharing power with an equally strong legislature had nearly cost them victory. In a letter to William Gordon, George Washington wrote, “to suppose that the general concern of this Country can be directed by thirteen heads, or one head without competent powers, is a solecism, the bad effects of which every Man who has had the practical knowledge to judge from, that I have, is fully convinced of; tho’ none perhaps has felt them in so forcible, and distressing a degree.”2 Reflecting this concern, the Constitution authorized extensive power to the federal government. The distribution of this centralized power among the branches of government was to prevent any of them from wielding power arbitrarily. Congress and the Constitution Congressional Powers. The Constitution provides Congress with a formidable array of tools that authorize it to participate in national security matters. It has the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to determine the rules and regulations governing the military, and to call forth the militia in times of crisis. Additionally, presidents must seek the “advice and 103 104 American National Security consent” of the Senate for treaty ratification and the appointment of senior governmental officials, including military officers. Ultimately, Congress influences the executive via the power of the purse. With the ability “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” Congress determines the appropriations levels for the entire executive branch, including the national security apparatus . The Constitution specifies that the Army should not receive operational and pay appropriations for longer than a two-year term, so technically each Congress must reestablish the army or it must demobilize.3 This provision reflects the Founding Fathers’ fear of standing armies under the control of a despotic leader (in their case, the king of England during the Revolutionary War). Mindful of its institutional power, Congress carefully protects its ability to use the power of the purse to shape foreign policy. In the debate over the 1994 defense appropriations bill, which occurred shortly after the death of eighteenAmerican soldiers during the U.S. intervention in Somalia, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) stated: This is the appropriate bill on which to debate our policy in Somalia, because it highlights the importance of the power of the purse—the ultimate arrow in Congress’ quiver—to effect the policy of the Nation in such weighty matters as war and deployments of American Forces. The Framers of the Constitution were well aware that the power of the purse was the key to the power of this institution, and we cannot guard the American people and it too closely.4 Despite the intent to assert congressional prerogative, it is evident in these comments that Congress is reacting to national security policies already set in motion by the president. Presidential initiatives create a momentum that even a united Congress can find difficult to overcome, and the 535 members of Congress have perhaps never held uniform views or priorities. Richard Fenno suggests that legislators have three key motivations: reelection, good public policy, and advancement to higher office.5 On the campaign trail, members of Congress rarely focus on foreign and national security policy. These are not the characteristic bread-and-butter issues that bring federal largesse to home districts and states. Characterizing this paucity of attention to this aspect of national policy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) observed, “There’s almost no political sex appeal. . . . For those who get involved it’s strictly a pro bono service.”6 In fact, public opinion generally lags behind the course of international events; consequently, Congress ends up legislating for future events against the errors of the past. Recent examples of this include the clarification of...