In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

c h a p t e r e i g h t “฀INk-HaPPy฀ DO-gOODERS,”฀ 1960–1978 Back in 1960, American automobility was at its zenith. Car ownership was at an all-time high, the American automobile industry was prospering as never before, Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway Project was well underway, and auto-centric architectural and land-use patterns had become the norm in metropolitan areas across the United States. Cheered by many Americans as evidence of postwar progress and prosperity, these developments had come at a steep price, however. Fifteen years earlier, just after World War II, residents of the booming Los Angeles area were puzzled by the appearance of a brownish haze that enveloped their city during the daylight hours. Subsequent research concluded that this haze, known as photochemical smog, was largely due to automobile exhaust emissions.1 Meanwhile , as aggregate miles and average speeds climbed, the number of annual automobile-accident deaths rose, steadily creeping toward the 40,000-per-year mark in the late 1950s.2 Together with widespread reports of dishonest practices at automobile dealerships, a general level of new-car fit and finish that was hit or miss at best, and the specter of neighborhoods and cities torn apart by endless ribbons of elevated superhighways, these growing problems had, in the words of James J. Flink, led “many Americans [to begin] to have critical second thoughts about the automobile industry and its product.”3 Many, that is, began to doubt the wisdom of Charles E. Wilson’s famous dictum, for indeed, it was no longer crystal clear that what was good for General Motors actually was good for America.4 In spite of their concerns, Americans continued to purchase new cars at a record pace as the 1950s came to a close. And as they did, they expressed an unambiguous preference for luxury options such as radios, automatic transmissions, “ i n k - h a p p y d o - g o o d e r s ,” 1 9 6 0 – 1 9 7 8 161 power windows, and large-displacement engines over those geared more toward safety or economy. Most of the OEMs offered seat belts as optional equipment by the mid-1950s, for example, and Ford even offered a comprehensive safety package. But very few new-car buyers were actually willing to pay for these extracost features.5 Or so the OEMs claimed, for critics both at the time and since have argued that the industry’s inability to sell safety during the 1950s and the early 1960s wasn’t actually due to consumer preferences. Instead, they claim, the OEMs’ collective emphasis on performance and style in its designs and advertising came at the expense of any real attempt to engineer and sell meaningful safety features.6 Either way, in reality power, style, and convenience sold well, and safety did not. Neither the automobile companies nor the federal government seemed to be particularly concerned about any of this. The OEMs did make fleeting gestures toward the goal of improved highway safety during the 1950s, enacting an industry-wide, AMA-backed racing ban in 1957 and establishing a formal body to develop automobile safety standards known as the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact (VESC) in 1958.7 For its part, the government did begin to fund initiatives during the 1950s to explore the root causes and the long-term implications of urban air pollution.8 But as the 1960s dawned, all of this was ancient history. The OEMs never actually took their self-imposed “racing ban” very seriously, and by 1960 all of them once again emphasized horsepower and performance in their advertising and openly sponsored racing associations and teams.9 In addition , the industry’s underfunded, understaffed VESC only managed to produce a single new-car safety standard.10 Moreover, although the California legislature did make the quantum leap from passive research to meaningful action when it passed its landmark Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act in 1960, Congress did not follow suit.11 By 1963, however, the federal government was no longer able to ignore the fact that urban air pollution was getting worse, and not just in Los Angeles. More to the point, public opinion was shifting as well, for although few were willing to give up (or even curtail) their new auto-centered lifestyles, an ever-larger share of the voting public was equally unwilling to live with dirty air. Congress therefore passed the first of what would become a series...

Share