Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy

4 Intelligence Surprise: Deception, Innovation, Proliferation

C H A P T E R 4 Intelligence Surprise Deception, Innovation,Proliferation On May 11, 1998, India announced to the world that it had initiated a series of five nuclear tests at its Pokhran test range in Rajasthan. These explosions broke the country's twenty-four-yearself-imposedmoratorium on nuclear testing . Both the USintelligence community and USpolicymakers were caught by surprise. Just a few months later, in East Asia, North Korea startled the world by launching a three-stage rocket. Not only did the missile's overflight ofJapanese territory provoke sharp diplomatic discord but its unexpectedly sophisticated technical parameters again caught policymakersby surprise. The intelligence community was reportedly unaware of the existence of a third stage, which, while not entirely successful, Pyongyang later declared to be an attempted satellite launch. The congressionally mandated blue-ribbon Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States concluded in this context that "deception and denial efforts are intense, and often successful , and U.S.collection and analysis assets are limited."1 Two years later, DCI George Tenet testified that there was a high risk of continued surprise in a contemporary international-security environment characterized by "rapid change [that] makesus even more vulnerable to sudden surprise ."2 In his March 2000 congressional testimony, Tenet outlined four principal reasons for this risk. First, and in his view most important, is the increasing sophistication of denial and deception efforts on the part of proliferant states. Would-be proliferants now routinely employ measures designed to deny the United States a window on both their evolving intentions and their improving capabilities. Second is the increasing availability of dual-use technologies that effectively mask the intentions of proliferant states. While nonproliferation measures have traditionally been predicated on a technologydenial strategy, existing arms and export control regimes do not sufficiently impede the spread of many weapons-related technologies, particularly those with civilian applications as well as potential military purposes. In the chem- 88 Combating Proliferation ical and biological arenas, the continuing spread of dual-use technology reduces the visible signatures of a proliferant'sweapons-related activities. Third is the availability of expertise that proliferantscan draw on to advance nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs. The supply-side labor surplus brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union differentiates the contemporary environment from its Cold War corollary; the growing indigenization of production capabilities will further enlarge this specialized labor pool. Finally, the pace of technological progress is accelerating as information and advanced technologies become increasingly available worldwide. Even as 1940s-era technology continues to suffice for some weapons-related applications , recent and continuing advances stand to significantlyease research, development , and production difficulties and may also facilitatethe concealment and localization of production activities. As the Indian and North Korean illustrations suggest, surprise in the proliferation context may be either political or technological in nature. These unexpected high-profile incidents raise several important issues for the intelligence , operational, and policy communities in the proliferation arena. For intelligence producers the challenge is twofold: both to field technologies or recruit assets that enhance the prospects for collection in this tough environment and to develop improved capabilities and methodological approaches that enhance analytic output. Forintelligence consumers the task issimilarly daunting. Policymakersmust develop strategiesto diminish the attractiveness of adversaries' acquisition, development, and use of WMD, while operators must seek to mitigate the effects of proliferation surpriseby continuing to improve the military's ability to operate more effectively in WMD environments. These imperatives are even more important if, as Tenet concludes, the risk of surprise not only is an immediate feature of the intelligence landscape but is becoming increasingly difficult to counter: 'The hill is getting steeper every year."3 The Indian and North Korean case studies that follow emphasize the difficulty of reading a proliferant's evolving intentions and developing capabilities , respectively. Misreading Intentions: India's Unexpected Nuclear Tests In 1974 India conducted what it referred to as a "peaceful nuclear explosion ," announcing immediately thereafter a moratorium on future tests but Intelligence Surprise 89 making its nuclear weapons potential clear.Twenty-one years later USsatellites detected activity at the Pokhran test site. Analystsbelieved that this activity was indicative of preparations for another nuclear test. In an effort to prevent a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent the United States sent a letter of demarche to the Indian government presenting evidence of India's test preparations .4 This use of diplomatic pressurewas...