Pachakutik and the Rise and Decline of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement

Chapter 5. The Indigenous Movement as Sisyphus: The Zenith and the Nadir of Power, 2000–2003

 Chapter 5 The Indigenous Movement as Sisyphus The Zenith and the Nadir of Power, 2000–2003 [The National Salvation Front] served to strengthen the indigenous movement [and] to deepen the unity of Ecuadorians who want changes. —Antonio Vargas Huatatoca, president of CONAIE, to a reporter after his participation in the short-lived “coup” of January 21, 2000 I’m talking about Antonio Vargas, who has divided the indigenous movement. —Eduardo Remache, president of ECUARUNARI, to a reporter on Vargas’s unilateral decision to be a presidential candidate, 2002 We are the government. —Miguel Lluco, Pachakutik national coordinator, to reporters when asked if Pachakutik was part of the newly elected government of President Lucio Gutiérrez, 2002 on january 21, 2000, a surprising and historically significant event took place in Quito. A few thousand indigenous protestors, aided by union and  the indigenous movement as sisyphus leftist militants and sympathetic elements of the military, took control of the National Congress building, the Supreme Court building, and finally the presidential palace.1 Some hours after the elected president, Jamil Mahuad Witt, had fled the palace, a triumvirate appeared before supporters and the press to announce an interim government by the National Salvation Front. The three-man junta consisted of army general Carlos Mendoza; Carlos Solorzano, a former Supreme Court justice; and Antonio Vargas, president of CONAIE. A number of public opinion polls both before and after January 21, indicated that 90 percent, or more, of the Ecuadorian population wanted Mahuad to leave office (Collins 2000). Nonetheless, the way in which his removal was accomplished and what happened later was both surprising and significant in a number of ways.One surprise was the apparent coalition between indigenous activists and the military, which had been developing for some months in opposition to the Mahuad government.Second,for both supporters and opponents, it was surprising to see an Indian, Vargas, sitting as part of a ruling coalition in Ecuador. A third surprise—to many a great disappointment,to others a tremendous relief—was that the junta lasted only a few hours before General Mendoza resigned and he and the joint command of the armed forces declared that they would follow the constitution and proceed with the installation of Vice President Gustavo Noboa Bejarano as president. For observers of Ecuador’s indigenous social movement, the events of January 21, 2000, were significant in another way. After years of claiming that Ecuador’s electoral politics and political parties were shams, CONAIE reversed itself in early 1996 by creating Pachakutik. At the time of el golpe (the coup),or la rebelión (or as some would prefer,la toma, the takeover),six Pachakutik deputies served in Congress and a number of former CONAIE officials and indigenous activists served in bureaucratic posts in President Mahuad’s government. The demands of CONAIE’s president Vargas and other indigenous leaders for the resignation of Mahuad, his cabinet, and the dissolution of Congress reflected a high degree of frustration with the mainstream paths of gaining access to political power, including frustration with the Pachakutik deputies. In essence, the dramatic events of January 21, 2000,brought to the forefront an inherent tension between social-movement militant tactics and more mainstream strategies to gain access to traditional political power via elected and appointed positions.  chapter 5 The Aftermath of the 1998 Elections: Pachakutik, Politics as Usual, and the Ouster of Mahuad The 1998 elections were disappointing for Pachakutik. The political movement’s tendency to form alliances with all manner of other parties and movements intensified the growing perspective that Pachakutik, rather than forging a new politics of integrity was instead succumbing to politics as usual.Those pragmatic preelection alliances continued as postelection pacts within the National Congress.For example,Nina Pacari,Pachakutik’s newly elected national deputy, cut a deal with the right-wing party Popular Democracy (DP). Pacari agreed to support DP’s Juan José Pons for president of Congress in exchange for her being selected as Congress’s second vice president.Making matters worse,Pacari agreed to be nominated by a deputy from the equally conservative Social Christian Party (PSC) rather than a Pachakutik deputy. Pacari’s actions incensed many Pachakutik militants who demanded that she resign her legislative seat (Van Cott 2005, 129). Moreover, this type of deal making directly contradicted CONAIE’s longstanding opposition to conspiring in any way with Ecuador’s traditional parties, particularly those on the right...