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23: reaction to the tet offensive (1968) iwas invited to give a series of lectures at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC. I also had appointments in Honolulu, Los Angeles, and New York before returning home through London, Paris, and Rome. Before departing I had another meeting with President Thieu, and pointed out that he needed to broaden his political base. “The Catholics support you, but you must earn the backing of the Buddhists.” “I know you are closely connected with the Buddhists,” he replied. “Can’t you do something to get them to support the government?” “You know I am with you personally, but that doesn’t solve the problem,” I told him. “The Buddhists won’t support you or the government just because I do, or because I ask them to. You must first compromise with them on national policies, give them reason to think backing you will improve things.” Then he parroted the same old refrain so often used by elite Vietnamese who had, consciously or unconsciously, adopted the “blame-Communism-for-everything ” attitude of the French first and the Americans currently. He revealed that he still did not recognize the real enemies. “How can I compromise with them? Their leaders are at least pro-Communist, if not outright Communists?” “No, no; you are wrong! They are all anti-Communist, just as much as we are. Communism would put down all religions, including Buddhism, and they know that. It’s just that their concept of what needs to be done in our country differs from that of the government and the U.S. leadership. In a word, the Buddhists feel that the Vietnamese government and its leaders must set an example of high personal standards and help foster a sense of national identity and pride. The government must protect and take care of the people; officials and military officers must be more concerned with the welfare of the peasants and workers. Corrupt and unjust officials and officers who use the people as pawns in their struggles to amass power and wealth must be uprooted. Then, by virtue of their deeds, the government and its leaders will have no trouble attracting support from the people. And the real enemies will be at least neutralized, if not converted to the government side.” Thieu listened passively. My words seemed to have little effect on him, and future events showed he neither understood nor heeded what I was trying to explain to him. Before I left, he insisted that I report to him immediately upon my return. On the first stage of our flight, the 707 hit some turbulence. Suddenly a multicolored skyline seemed to rise out of the ocean and waken me from my reverie. We 300 vietnam labyrinth were approaching Hong Kong. I looked around the plane, noting that most of the passengers were GIs wearing civilian clothes and looking forward to a stretch of R&R. I recognized just two familiar faces: Philip Habib, previously Ambassador Lodge’s chief political officer at the embassy, now deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia; and my old friend Lieutenant General Lu Lan, an RVN officer. Habib enjoyed a reputation in the American bureaucracy as one of the most knowledgeable Americans on Vietnamese affairs. He was an enthusiastic hawk who had opposed Edward Lansdale’s sociopolitical approach and could barely hide his disdain for the Vietnamese generals and politicians, most of whom he considered hopelessly corrupt. General Lu Lan had been a classmate of mine at the military academy, and we had remained close over the years. Although he was two years younger than I was,1 I regarded him, and the other younger men, more highly than I did some of the older army officers who held high rank at the time. Lu Lan and others of his age formed the young generation of Vietnamese nationalists in the army. They were too young to have been involved in the start of the French war in 1945. They had not had to choose between the nationalists who fought for a free Vietnam and those who sided with the French. The latter group, which included Thieu and others who now headed the government, hid behind the shield of anti-Communism. The fact was, Communism had not yet fully developed when they had submitted to French domination in 1946 and took arms against their fellow countrymen. Anti-Communism was simply a convenient means for them to justify their actions. Their submissiveness and resulting inferiority...

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