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“Thus We Shall Have Their Loyalty and They Our Favor”: Diplomatic Hostage-Taking (amanatstvo) and Russian Empire in Caucasia
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Dubitando: Studies in History and Culture in Honor of Donald Ostrowski. Brian J. Boeck, Russell E. Martin, and Daniel Rowland, eds. Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2012, 139–63. “Thus We Shall Have Their Loyalty and They Our Favor”: Diplomatic Hostage-Taking (amanatstvo) and Russian Empire in Caucasia Sean Pollock And we claimed the whole realm anew. And whoever came to Our Court himself or [sent?] an envoy and presents and letters [and] hostages (as) promises (of loyalty) [?] to [Our] Court, he would have fame (?) and other things (?). — Narseh, king of Persia, The Sassanian Inscription of Paikuli (AD 293–96) For many years I used to receive remuneration from the Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan; but now, having forgotten all about their favor, I placed myself under the [Russian] sovereign’s au-‐‑ thority. I wish to serve the sovereign exclusively, together with my children and my entire clan and all the land, until I die, and as soon as you [Rus-‐‑ sian] emissaries return from Georgia, I will send my son to the sovereign with you. — Prince Sholokh of Kabarda, ca. 1589 This essay examines one of the key institutions for regulating political rela-‐‑ tions between Russia and the native groups of Caucasia from the middle of the 16th to the 19th century. In the Russian sources, the institution is usually referred to as amanatstvo, which I define as diplomatic hostage-‐‑taking, and the hostages, as amanaty. Beginning in the 16th century, the Russian government demanded diplomatic hostages from the non-‐‑Christian peoples of northern Caucasia in an attempt to guarantee their allegiance. Evidence suggests that the institution touched the lives of thousands of Russians and non-‐‑Russians, in the capitals and at the edges of Russia’s empire. Yet despite its importance as a means of projecting Russian power in Caucasia and across the Eurasian steppe, the institution has received scant attention from historians of Russia.1 1 An exception is Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 56–60. Kho-‐‑ 140 SEAN POLLOCK As a result, relatively little is known about its salient features or the expe-‐‑ riences of the hostages themselves. Diplomatic hostage-‐‑taking has a long history that transcends the Russian context altogether. I trace this history in the early part of the essay in order to gain perspective on the Russian case. Given the enormous heterogeneity and complexity of the Russian imperial experience, it is important to delineate and analyze Russian imperial policies, institutions, and practices in a particular re-‐‑ gion. My main goal is to explain how the institution functioned in the context of Russian-‐‑Caucasian relations, and to analyze efforts by political entrepre-‐‑ neurs on both sides of the cultural divide to have it serve their own interests. In addition, I attempt to distinguish between Russian and Caucasian perspec-‐‑ tives on the institution, although I do not assume that these perspectives took shape in isolation from each other. Finally, I sketch the life of one diplomatic hostage, a certain Kazbulat Murza, also known as Dmitrii Taganov. In exam-‐‑ ining his life, I argue that diplomatic hostages could transcend their original calling as human sureties and aspire to play crucial, independent roles in Russia’s efforts to build its empire in Caucasia. Their stories can open a fasci-‐‑ nating window onto the problem of assimilating non-‐‑Russians into the social fabric of the Russian Empire. Diplomatic hostage-‐‑taking was not an innovation of the Russian diplo-‐‑ matic corps, but rather thrived wherever imperial pretensions were strong and imperial power was relatively weak. Historically, diplomatic hostages were often creatures of imperial frontiers, spaces where multiple, previously distinct societies—some indigenous, others intrusive—interacted.2 In Cauca-‐‑ sia, hostage-‐‑taking was, like empire itself, a negotiated process requiring the active participation of Russians and Caucasians alike. Both Russians and Cau-‐‑ casians recognized the institution as characteristic of politics in the region, and both attempted to exploit it in self-‐‑serving ways. Hostage-‐‑taking demon-‐‑ strated their commitment to building a mutually beneficial cross-‐‑cultural partnership. At the same time, it underscored the fundamentally unequal na-‐‑ ture of the partnership. Part of Russia’s strategy to lord over Caucasia (among other places), hostage-‐‑taking, as the case of Dmitrii Taganov shows, could also serve as a conduit for transmitting Russian imperial ways. In doing so, it provided ambitious indigenous elites with opportunities to excel at their Rus-‐‑ sian master’s game. darkovsky tells the story...
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