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Russia’s Century of Revolutions: Parties, People, Places. Studies Presented in Honor of Alexander Rabinowitch. Michael S. Melancon and Donald J. Raleigh, eds. Bloomington, IN: Slavica Publishers, 2012, 153–72.       Revolution as Lived Experience: Soviet Baby Boomers, M. S. Gorbachev, and Perestroika Donald J. Raleigh The   attempt   by   Mikhail   Sergeevich   Gorbachev   between   1985   and   1991   to   reconfigure   the   Stalinist   economic   model   and   to   democratize   and   thereby   reinvent   the   Soviet   system—perestroika,   or   restructuring—represented   Rus-­‐‑ sia’s  last  revolution  of  the  twentieth  century.  Gennadii  Ivanov,  a  retired  police   investigator  from  the  city  of  Saratov,  reminded  me  of  a  joke  circulating  at  the   time,   which   captures   how   many   Soviet   citizens   felt   about   the   six   years   of   reform   that   shook   the   world.   “Do   you   think   perestroika   was   launched   by   scientists   or   by   politicians?   Of   course,   by   politicians.   Scientists   would   have   first  experimented  on  dogs.”  This  sentiment  expresses  the  fact  that  Gorbachev   remains  far  more  popular  outside  Russia  than  at  home.1  How  does  the  critical   Soviet  generation  born  after  World  War  II,  the  country’s  Cold  War  or  Baby   Boomer  generation,  evaluate  the  man  who  presided  over  the  USSR’s  transfor-­‐‑ mation  and  decline?  How  do  its  members  account  for  the  launching  of  pere-­‐‑ stroika?   What   sentiments   did   they   express   about   the   breakup   of   the   Soviet   Union?   To   answer   these   questions,   this   essay   draws   on   oral   interviews   I   con-­‐‑ ducted  for  a  larger  project  that  traces  the  transformative  developments  of  the   second   half   of   the   twentieth   century   that   brought   down   the   Soviet   empire   through  the  life  stories  of  the  country’s  first  post-­‐‑World-­‐‑War-­‐‑II  generation.2   The  sixty  individuals  I  study  graduated  in  1967  from  Moscow’s  School  No.  20   or  from  Saratov’s  School  No.  42,  then  recently  opened  “magnet”  schools  that   offered  intensive  instruction  in  English.  Most  members  of  this  cohort  still  live   in   Moscow,   Saratov,   or   elsewhere   in   Russia;   others   have   emigrated   to   the   U.S.,  Canada,  Israel,  and  Western  Europe.  Part  of  the  USSR’s  “Baby  Boomer”   generation,   they   grew   up   during   the   Cold   War,   but   in   a   Soviet   Union   that   increasingly   distanced   itself   from   the   excesses   of   Stalinism.   Unlike   earlier   Soviet  generations,  whose  success  in  transforming  the  country  into  the  other   superpower  was  tempered  by  nagging  shortages,  deprivations,  famine,  arbi-­‐‑ trary   terror,   and   a   horrific   war,   the   postwar   generation   benefited   from                                                                                                                             1 M.  K.  Gorshkov,  Rossiiskoe  obshchestvo  v  usloviiakh  transformatsii:  Mify  i  real’nost’.  Sotsi-­‐‑ ologicheskii  analiz,  1992–2002  (Moscow:  ROSSPEN,  2003),  418–19. 2 See   my   Soviet   Baby   Boomers:   An   Oral   History   of   Russia’s   Cold   War   Generation   (New   York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012). 154 DONALD J. RALEIGH decades  of  peaceful,  organic,  evolutionary  development  that  predated—and   perhaps   even   determined—Gorbachev’s   coming   to   power   in   1985.   During   this  generation’s  childhood  and  young  adulthood,  the  Soviet  leadership  dis-­‐‑ mantled  the  Gulag,  ruled  without  terror,  promoted  consumerism,  and  opened   the  country  in  teaspoon-­‐‑size  doses  to  an  outside  world  that  feared  Soviet-­‐‑style   communism.   Reaching   their   prime   during   the   Gorbachev   era,   these   Soviet   Baby  Boomers  today  constitute  elements  of  Russia’s  and  other  countries’  pro-­‐‑ fessional  urban  class.   Taking  an  oral  history  approach  appealed  to  me  because,  thanks  to  Gor-­‐‑ bachev’s  efforts,  Russian  citizens  began  talking  about  their  past  and  trying  to   make  sense  of  it,  and  I  saw  obvious  benefits  in  listening  in.  More  specifically,  I   examine   a   group   of   individuals   conceived   in   1948–49,   when   Soviet   propa-­‐‑ ganda   declared   that   efforts   to   “reconstruct”   the   war-­‐‑ravaged   country   had   been  completed.  Despite  stepped  up  repression  at  home  and  a  reinvigorated   anti-­‐‑Western   campaign   fueled   by   an   escalating   Cold   War,   the   government   had  lifted  martial  law,  demobilized  the  Red  Army,  and  ended  the  worst  of   rationing  resulting  from  wartime  destruction  and  postwar  famine.  Although   there  is  virtually  unanimous  agreement  that  this  generation  across  the  globe   has  played  a  vital,  even  defining,  role  in  transforming  the  climate  of  the  con-­‐‑ temporary  world,  scholars  have  neglected  its  Soviet  equivalent.3   I  selected  this  particular  group  of  individuals  not  only  because  of  its  man-­‐‑ ageable   size,   but   also   because   its   members   are   historically  and  contextually   connected,   well   educated,   articulate,   and   remain   loosely   networked.   That   they  attended  specialized  schools  is  likewise  of  consequence  since  their  very   appearance  symbolizes  the  country’s  cautious  opening  to  the  outside  world   amid   the   changing   battlefields   of   the   Cold   War   and   a   domestic   climate   of   heady  optimism.  By  no  means  a  homogeneous  cohort,  the  individuals  I  inter-­‐‑ viewed  undoubtedly  had  different  expectations  and  life  experiences  than  less   educated,  less  well-­‐‑connected,  or...

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