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John Bartle, Michael C. Finke, and Vadim Liapunov, eds. From Petersburg to Bloomington: Essays in Honor of Nina Perlina. Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2012, 65–79. (Indiana Slavic Studies, 18.) The Role of Chronotope in Dialog   Michael Holquist       Nina   Perlina’s   scholarship   is   best   characterized   by   its   scrupulous   attention   to   small   details   from   which   she   extracts   significant   new   meanings.  Her  academic  escutcheon  might  well  have  as  its  motto,  “in   specialibus  generalia  quaerimus.”  Unable  to  match  her  exquisite  akri-­‐‑ beia,  I’d  nevertheless  like  to  pay  a  small  tribute  in  the  form  of  a  medi-­‐‑ tation  on  one  of  Bakhtin’s  footnotes.  It  is  not  just  any  footnote,  how-­‐‑ ever,  but  the  infamous  qualification  he  appends  to  the  first  pages  of  his   essay  on  the  chronotope  in  which  he  sets  himself  off  from  Kant.   Chronotope  has  been  one  of  the  most  frequently  invoked  items  in   the  toolbox  of  Dialogism.  It  remains,  however,  one  of  the  most  vexed   categories  in  the  Bakhtinian  canon.  A  recurring  dilemma  is  the  ques-­‐‑ tion,  “What—precisely—is  the  field  of  inquiry  in  which  the  term  has   its  greatest  relevance?”  It  is  clearly  about  time  and  space,  but  time  and   space  as  experienced  where:  in  literature  or  in  real  life?  Time/space  as   experienced  by  whom—characters  in  fictional  texts,  by  the  author,  by   the  characters,  by  readers  of  literature,  or  by  human  beings  in  life  as   well  as  literature?  Is  the  chronotope  a  literary,  or  an  anthropological,   metaphysical,  or  existential  category?  Or  does  it  share  boundaries  with   all  these  disciplines,  and  if  so,  how  shall  we  discriminate  between  their   applications?   There   are   many   reasons   for   this   confusion,   beginning   with   Bakhtin’s   own   expository   imprecision   in   the   long   essay   he   de-­‐‑ voted   to   the   subject   in   1937–38.   Problems   associated   with   the   term   were  compounded  when  in  1973  Bakhtin  added  a  new  set  of  “conclud-­‐‑ ing  remarks”  to  his  earlier  text.     In   the   end,   however,   I   believe   that   difficulties   in   understanding   chronotope  derive  fundamentally  from  the  central  place  it  occupies  in   Bakhtin’s  core  conception  of  dialog.  In  what  might  be  called  the  para-­‐‑ dox  of  ubiquity,  we  fail  to  see  the  tree  for  the  forest.  Chronotope  is  so   omnipresent  throughout  Bakhtin’s  oeuvre  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  it  as  a   freestanding  topic  in  its  own  right.  In  this  essay,  I  am  going  to  argue   66 Michael Holquist that  the  chronotope  is  everywhere  in  Bakhtin,  because  chronotope  is,   in  fact,  the  master  key  to  his  whole  theory  of  dialog.     Dialog,  no  matter  how  defined,  is  a  relationship.  A  question  that  is   so  obvious  that  it  often  goes  unasked,  much  less  answered,  is  why  the   particular   relationship   of   dialog   became   the   topic   that   dominated   Bakhtin’s   thinking   throughout   his   career.   I   will   say   more   about   this   later,  but  suffice  it  here  that  I  interpret  Bakhtin’s  lifelong  commitment   to  dialog  as  a  late  reaction  to  Kant’s  Copernican  revolution  in  episte-­‐‑ mology,   founded   as   it   was   on   the   primacy   of   relations   over   mere   things.   Stated  as  a  one-­‐‑line  zinger,  my  thesis  is  that  the  claim  in  the  Cri-­‐‑ tique  of  Pure  Reason  that  human  perception  is  confined  to  representa-­‐‑ tions  of  things  (Vorstellungen),  and  that  we  can  never  know  the  world   as   it   is   (noumena,   the   Ding-­‐‑an-­‐‑sich)   transforms   our   perception   and   thinking   into   a   necessary   give-­‐‑and-­‐‑take   between   mind   and   world,   mind   and   other   minds.   Without   the   absolute   assurance   that   comes   from  contact  with  things  in  themselves,  knowledge  ineluctably  trans-­‐‑ forms  into  a  gamble  with  reality,  an  experiment,  a  dialog  of  inference   in  the  mind  and  responses  from  the  world  that  more  or  less  confirm  or   disconfirm  our  hypotheses.  Kantian  epistemology  makes  knowing  the   product  of  work.  It  converts  thinking  into  an  endless  dialog  between   minds  and  world  in  which  we  more  or  less  correctly  gauge  the  appro-­‐‑ priateness  of  our  response.  In  Bakhtin’s  post-­‐‑Kantian  universe  the  ba-­‐‑ sic  tool  or  instrument  for  judging  the  accuracy  of  our  epistemological   experiments  is  time/space.  The  chronotope  is  the  instrument  that  per-­‐‑ mits  calibration  of  the  time/space  coordinates  without  which  thinking   and   communication—human   understanding,   indeed—would   be   im-­‐‑ possible.  Quite  simply,  chronotopes  provide  the  clock  and  the  map  we   employ  to  orient  our  identity  in  the  flux  of  existence.     This   is   a   large   claim   that   requires   grounding   in   both   a   historical   and  a  theoretical  analysis.   History of Conceiving Time/Space in Bakhtin Let  me  begin  by  rapidly  reviewing  the  role  of  chronotope  in  Bakhtin’s   own   thinking   over   the   course   of...

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