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9. Shifting Gears, 1989-93
- Wilfrid Laurier University Press
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Table 8.2 Statistical Overview of Decentralized Posts, 198990 Estimate of 198990 bilateral Bridgetown (Barbados) Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) Manila (Philippines) Dakar (Senegal) Singapore (Singapore) Jakarta (Indonesia) San Jose (Costa Rica) Abidjan (Ivory Coast) Harare (Zimbabwe) ($ million) 20.9 30.8 26.3 33.2 3.0 52.4 20.8 63.1 16.5 267.0 Distribution of AID PYS before and after decentralization3 Before 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 7 5 23 Additional 13 5 6 13 4 6 7 35 26 115C After 15 7 7 15 5 8 8 42 31 138 Locally engaged staff Staffb 8 18 25 54 15 17 16 206 50 409 Officers 5 5 0 2 3 0 5 7 8 35 Total 13 23 25 56 18 17 21 213 58 444 a Includes satellites for Dakar, San Jose, Abidjan and Harare. b Includeschauffeurs and guards. c Includes fiftyseven transferredfrom Hull and fiftyeight new. Excludestwo PYS inRwanda. Source: Groupe Secor, Canadian InternationalDevelopmentAgency, "Strategic ManagementReview: Working Document," October 9, 1991, p. 39/2 dilateral desbursement ODA Policy Reviewed, 198489 309 ation expressed "strong fear" that small exporters and consultants would be especially disadvantaged. He acknowledged thatdecentralization could improve the quality of aid but we do not think it will speed up the deliv ery mechanism. Only a few months of the decision process is being moved to the field. The major part of the decision process remains in Canada and should be subject to a major overhaul in order to cut the time to select consultants and the time between project identification and project implementation.163 Similar concerns were voiced at CIDA's annual consultation with CEA164 and persisted in informal contacts—especially with consultants who saw them selves disadvantaged by developing country competitors and with suppliers who complained that decentralized posts were using too much of their new untying authority. There was also disquiet within the NGO community,notwithstanding earlier rhetorical support for decentralization. Agencies vying for bilateral contracts were affected most directly, but others worried about increased direct funding of southern country NGOs and more CIDA intervention in relations between Canadian and Third World voluntary organizations. There was fear that delivery through External Affairs would weaken the develop mental thrust of the aid program. CCIC advised members against rushing to establish separate overseas offices, urging instead stronger links with local NGOs and increased participation in cooperative funding arrangements like the South Asia Partnership.165 In an otherwise highly critical 1991 assessment of CIDA postWinegard, the Interchurch Fund for International Development (ICFID) was cautiously positive about decentralization. It did, however, complain about luxuriousand sheltered lifestyles within expatriate diplomatic ghettos—and, from a Zim babwe case study, about insensitivity to local business in adhering strictly to foreign service regulations requiringallCanadian content for houses, offices, and equipment. It reported "happily" that CIDA officers had not bypassed locally based Canadian NGOs to relate directly to their indigenous partners, but "there have been several examples of locally hired staff being drawn away from local NGOs by higher salaries. This certainly seems to conflict with CIDA's goal of strengthening local institutions."166 A quiet burial. The problems of managing an aid program split between cen tralized and decentralized modes, and between External Affairs and CIDA, might have been sufficient to end the experiment, especially since there was considerable business opposition as well. The official explanation was cost. Certainly a major catalyst in unravelling the process was the April 1989 bud get cut. Landry and CatleyCarlson faced tough questioning from opposition members of SCEAIT when the Estimates showed increased administrative expenses in 198990 of $86.3 million (including $67.6 million for decentral [54.152.77.92] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 17:32 GMT) 310 Aid and Ebb Tide ization). Landry kept reminding the committee that all parties had supported decentralization, but Christine Stewart and Lloyd Axworthy, the Liberal crit ics for development and external affairs respectively, asserted that their sup port was contingent on maintaining the commitment to a rising ODA/GNP ratio (now effectively abandoned). CatleyCarlson replied that "the amount of cost sunk in this exercise was such that it was not a good business decision to cut off this expenditure when the exercise is ... three quarters complete." Besides, she said, decentralization amounted to a mere 2.5 per cent of pro gram costs and was projected to decline to 1.8 per cent. She emphasized how seriously the government...