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94 Aid and Ebb Tide tying in the bilateral program and the overall share of multilateralaid. On the former, in order "to improve the flexibility of the Canadian programme to meet specific requirements of high development priority," procurement con­ ditions would be liberalized to cover shipping costs on all goods made avail­ able through ODA, and "to make available up to 20 per cent of total bilateral allocations on a completely untied basis for projects and programmes of par­ ticularly high development priority." As the previous policy had restricted every individual project to an untied maximumof 25 per cent, including ship­ ping costs, and little use had as yet been made of that authority,the potential change from previous practice was substantial. A further commitment was made to work with other donors towards a more general agreement on untying.132 Further untying was foreseen, and a strong commitment to multilateral institutions was expressed, in a pledge to increase "within the next five years" the proportion of multilateral assistance to 25 per cent of the overall program.133 Falling short of of a dramatic increase, this target still represented a commitment to go beyond the minimumburden expected of Canada inter­ nationally and the Pearson commission's recommendation of 20 per cent. The policy on volume was more cautious. While mentioning neither a specific target nor a timetable, the document did promise that ODA funds would be increased over the coming years "to move towards theinternation­ ally­accepted targets." More specifically, "the Government will endeavour to increase each year the percentage of national income allocated to official development assistance"; this commitment "will enable" the aid budget "to grow on a regular and dependable basis that will provide a substantial increase in the proportion of Canadian resources allocated to development assistance by the middle of the decade."134 The white paper addressed, in general and open­ended terms, how to choose aid recipients and how to achieve a reasonable degree of concentra­ tion within them. On country eligibility, Reuber's list of criteria was pre­ sented in a modified form as "a number of principles" by which bilateral aid "can" be allocated. "Historical factors which support a special sense of con­ cern" replaced political importance for Canada, and any direct reference to the potential for exercising developmental leverage was deleted. Degree of poverty, proximity to self­sustaining growth, developmental performance, availability of good projects and programs to match Canadian expertise, and concentration in the interests of improving effectiveness and impact were cited as principles to inform allocation decisions. No guidance on how to attach relative weights was offered, apart from the comment that "each leads to difficult anomalies if used as a sole criterion." Maurice Strong and the Creation of CIDA, 1966­70 95 A commitment was made to allocate approximately 80 per cent of bilat­ eral funds over the next three to five years to an unspecified number of "countries of concentration." The remainder would go to other countries, mostly for education and technical assistance, and also "for occasional capi­ tal projects of high development priority."135 Not mentioned was the intro­ duction in 1970 of Mission Administered Funds (MAP), small allocations for local projects disbursed directly by Canadian diplomatic posts, that relieved some of the pressures for full­scale bilateral programming. Though some­ times little more ambassadorial slush funds, MAP (subsequently renamed Canada Funds) have also supported some excellent and cost­effective grass­ roots projects. The new policies on procurement tying and multilateral aid, along with signals about increased funding and a more activist approach to country and sector specialization, were important as they carried cabinet backing. How­ ever, International Development fell far short of the exciting, forward­look­ ing document that Strong had wanted, or even a less ambitious codification of policy to provide guidance for delivering the aid program. George Cunning­ ham suggested that the review process was "probably a good deal more ambitious than that of the Pearson commission which was taking place at the same time." Yet the end product of the Canadian review was a slight pam­ phlet, "half of which is devoted to arguing a case for aid like a simple propa­ ganda appeal to doubtful members of the public, and half to policy intentions often expressed in vague terms."136 Strong agreed in retrospect that the white paper was disappointing: I remember being quite sad about the policy review.... I had hoped this would be an exciting new thing, that it would catch fire...

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