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7 - The Employment Act of 1946
- W.E. Upjohn Institute
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139 7 The Employment Act of 1946 The spirit was one of optimism as 1946 opened. The United States had defeated the powers of fascism and, in the process, had risen out of the Great Depression. Sacrifice and austerity gave way to pent-up consumer demand. People began having children at a rate that countered virtually a century of decline in the fertility rate. The United States had the deterrent power of the atomic bomb, without the full awareness of its horrors. It was a heady, joyful moment in the nation’s history. The enactment of the Employment Act of 1946 was true to this moment in time. It signaled a confidence that America could alleviate unemployment in peacetime as well as during the war, and that the federal government was ready to stimulate the economy when private enterprise fell short. It was a covenant between the federal government and the people that the United States would not tolerate depressions. FINAL PUSH FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT As 1946 opened, President Truman used his bully pulpit to advance the Senate-passed version of the full employment bill. During his radio speech of January 3, he encouraged voters to contact their representatives on behalf of “real” full employment legislation. Truman himself had already written to the congressional conferees urging them to approve no less than the Senate-passed bill (Truman 1961c).1 On January 6, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publicly recommended a permanent government commission on unemployment and business fluctuations. Although the U.S. Chamber of Commerce roundly rejected what it called “totalitarian collectivism,” it acknowledged that “numerous techniques and policies for shortening periods of income and job losses and avoiding extreme fluctuations are known.” The Chamber apparently recognized that it could not block enactment of some form of the full employment bill and opted to push for a verIn order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option. Job Name: -- /347091t 140 Wasem sion resembling H.R. 2202, which had become the House-passed S. 380 (Cotton 1946). In his 1946 State of the Union Message, President Truman continued to push for full employment legislation. In the speech, he asserted, “It is the responsibility of Government to gear its total program to the achievement of full production and full employment.” Again, he emphasized his wish that Congress would enact a full employment bill like the one the Senate had passed. Indeed, during the address Truman expressed strong and repeated references to the need for full employment (Truman 1961d). Public support for a federal role in job creation remained high. In a Fortune survey published in February 1946, only 17.7 percent of respondents chose the response “Let business and industry work out the problem without any government interference at all.” As Figure 7.1 depicts, a total of 38.1 percent selected the survey responses depicted by the two sections of the pie chart dealing with “continuous public works”: 10.3 percent of those chose large-scale continuous public works programs, and 27.8 percent chose public works programs that would ebb and flow with fluctuations in the business cycle. Almost onethird (31.0 percent) selected the survey response “Depend mainly on business and industry to create enough employment normally, and just provide work at those times when industry cannot employ everyone,” represented on the pie chart by the phrase “Business & industry with government” (Cantril 1951, p. 904). The day after Truman’s State of the Union address, the conference committee began meeting on the full employment legislation. Sen. Robert Wagner, initially the chair of the conference managers, had become ill a few weeks earlier and was not able to assume the task. This key sponsor of the original bill was replaced by respected Senate majority leader Alben Barkley (D-KY), who also supported the original language.2 The other Senate conference managers were Murdock, Taylor, Radcliffe, Tobey, Taft, and Buck. The House conferees were led by Manasco and included Cochran, Whittington, Bender, and Hoffman. From all unofficial accounts, it appears that the conferees engaged in a series of hard-fought struggles. During the first two sessions, no agreements were reached, and it took five sessions just to debate the bill’s opening declaration of policy. Meanwhile, rumors abounded not only of infighting between two pivotal administration officials—Vinson In order to view this proof accurately...