Pale Horse At Plum Run: The First Minnesota at Gettysburg

4. What meaner place could man be put in?

Whatmeanerplacecouldmanbeputin? robert e. lee had not been idle; he was forming his battle plan on the spot as the situation developed. Not having intended to fight on this ground and not really knowing the lay of the land well, he was searching for vulnerability in the Union line. J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry was sorely missed. Two separate early morning reconnaissance parties brought back information that the Union left flank did not extend to the Peach Orchard or Little Round Top areas. These reports would strongly influence Lee’s battle plan for the day, but it is inexplicable how the parties—especially the second one, returning at about 7:00 a.m.—could have missed the federal activity and the skirmishing fire.¹ Between 11:00 a.m. and noon Lee formed and set his plan— a massive assault on the Union left flank by General James Longstreet’s First Corps. After the attack had developed, a division of General A. P. Hill’s Third Corps was to attack the Union center on Cemetery Ridge.²While Lee was slow in formulating his plan, he was also poorly served by many of his subordinates. Longstreet was reluctant to attack until he had his full corps in position . He was allowed to wait for one more brigade but finally had to attack without one entire division.The poor reconnaissance also required a slow and stealthy march to avoid detection once it was realized the federals were all the way out to the Emmitsburg Road. Foot-dragging, miscommunication, and poor information resulted in an attack being 38 — 4— 0-8735-1-text 2/27/04 1:30 PM Page 38 PUB007 Macintosh HD:Desktop Folder: ordered around noon, to be launched as soon as possible, finally commencing at 4:00 p.m. Longstreet’s and Hill’s assaults were structured to progress in a trip hammer movement from the right, or southern, portion of their line through to the left. Each brigade was to move out after the brigade to its right had advanced and become engaged. This attack en echelon was eventually to involve the entire Confederate line up to its left-center, attacking the federal line until someone was able to punch through.³ General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps would attack Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, the “bend” and the “barb” of the fishhook-shaped Union line, as soon as Ewell heard Longstreet open the attack on the right. Keeping the entire federal line engaged would prevent Meade from moving troops to aid a weakened or collapsing portion of his line. While the Confederates planned and deployed, sharp skirmishing continued along the front out on the Emmitsburg Road. Artillery rounds kept passing over and occasionally exploding near the First Minnesota. General Meade finally received word of Sickles’s forward movement to the Emmitsburg Road, and he galloped to the advanced position as fast as he could. He found Sickles and began to question him hotly about the unauthorized advance. Sickles insisted that his orders had left him the latitude to use his judgment on the field and to move forward as he did. Meade made it clear that the advance was certainly not within his orders. Sickles was just offering to pull his men back to their original position when Confederate artillery opened fire on his corps. General Meade told him that it was too late to withdraw and that the Confederates massing to his front would definitely not let him withdraw in an orderly fashion without attacking. Sickles was to hold on, and Meade would send reinforcements as he was able.⁴ It was now about four o’clock in the afternoon, and the Confederates of Longstreet’s First Corps and elements of Hill’sThird Corps had begun their massive infantry assault on both faces of Sickles’s line with a twenty- to thirty-minute artillery barrage on the federal position. General Andrew Humphreys mentioned that the artillery started as his division was moving forward toward the Emmitsburg Road line.⁵ At about 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General John C. Caldwell, commanding the First Division of the Second Corps, was ordered to move his troops What meaner place could man be put in? 39 0-8735-1-text 2/27/04 1:30 PM Page 39 PUB007 Macintosh HD:Desktop Folder: 0-8735-1-text 2/27/04 1:31 PM Page 40 PUB007 Macintosh...