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Chapter 10: Palestinian Symbolic Trajectories to Oslo
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10 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQ Palestinian Symbolic Trajectories to Oslo zyxwvuts M i l l The intifada dramatically influenced the Palestinian symbol system. Writing in 1989, Rashid Khalidi observed that the intifada had created a "strong sense of national unity, of loyalty to a unified set of symbols and concepts and of mutual independence which were lacking in 1967.M Without question, the engine of Palestinian symbol transformation was the intifada. The intifada, in turn, helped make possible the Oslo agreement, which led to Yasir Arafat's return to Gaza in July 1994 and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority. In this chapter, we chart the symbolic precursors that made the Oslo Accords possible, account for the rhetorical significance of the accords, and depict the Palestinian movements that both affirmed and opposed attempts to reach a peace agreement with the Israelis. To accomplish this purpose, we discuss the symbolic backdrop to the agreement with the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on 15 November 1988 and Yasir Arafat's Geneva statements on 14 December 1988. We also consider the ideological, mythic, and rhetorical dimensions of Haidar Abdel Shan's speech to the Madrid peace conference on 31 October 1991, which has been called one of the most important Palestinian addresses of the twentieth century.2 zyxwvutsrqp 207 208 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Chapter Ten zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPO Symbolic Precursors to Shaft's Speech zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfed "From the intifada/' observed Edward Said, "went the inspiration and the force that transformed Diaspora caution and ambiguity into clarity and authentic vision: this of course was embodied in the 1988 Algiers PNC declarations /'3 Amos Elon agreed: "The intifada was an uprising not only against Israeli oppression, but also against the sterility of PLO rhetoric and terror/'4 The changes in the Palestinian symbol system brought about by the intifada are evident in the major statement that was the result of the 1988 Algiers conference of the PNC, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence . In that document, the Palestinians maintained the theme of the essential Palestinian but placed limits on the range of the ideological and mythic claims that all of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians. There are four distinct themes sounded in the Declaration of Independence that limited Palestinian ideology and myth.5 First, the Declaration implicitly embraced the principle of partition, envisioning two states, Palestine and Israel, coexisting on the same land. Although not mentioning Israel by name, the Declaration calls Palestine into being as a state dedicated to "the principles of peaceful-coexistence." The justification for the state is derived, in part, from the "international legitimacy as embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Organization since 1947."6 This constituted an explicit repudiation of the traditional Palestinian refusal to accept partition and affirmed the need to negotiate mutually acceptable boundaries. By accepting the principle of partition, the Declaration established symbolic limits to the Palestinian claim. These limits placed restrictions on Arabist and Islamic myths concerning the land of Palestine, making it possible for Palestinians to talk about living with a Jewish state. For the first time in Palestinian history, Palestinians made a clear decision to move beyond the doctrine of the "essential Palestinian." Second, the Declaration stipulated negotiation and international peace conferences as vehicles for establishing a two-state solution. The intifada brought about the realization that a primarily nonviolent social movement, serious attempts at negotiation, and attention to symbols and audiences were more likely to yield dividends than was violence. The Declaration overturned the "three nos" of Khartoum, as the Palestinians implicitly recognized Israel, the need for negotiation with Israel, and the failure of armed force to achieve the liberation of Palestine. Nonviolence, negotiation , and persuasion based on the acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 181 and 242 are identified in the Declaration as forces that could bring peace.7 [54.226.242.26] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 09:32 GMT) Palestinian Symbolic Trajectories to Oslo zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba 209 Third, the Declaration repudiated terrorism as a means to achieve Palestinian objectives. On this point, the Declaration distinguished between violence used in defense of Palestine and violence used in attacking the "territorial integrity" of other states. Once again, the influence of the intifada is evident, for the intifada did not identify Israel proper as a target of the low-scale and calibrated violence that was characteristic of the uprising . By rejecting terrorism, the Declaration abrogated the Palestinian National Charter's call for the use of "any means" to achieve the liberation of the land. Fourth, the Declaration did not demonize Israel or...