Democracy and Development in Mali

Overview—The Malian Path to Democracy and Development

Overview-The Malian Path to Democracy and Development R. JAMES BINGEN Mali's modern political history deserves close inspection for its contribution to the knowledge and practice of democracy and development. Since the creation of the First Republic in 1960, Mali's largely under-recognized political journey offers important evidence that can enhance our understanding and appreciation of the various ways in which democracies continue to be constructed little by little across Africa. Over the last thirty years we have witnessed the enduring nature of historic forms of popular control and the continuing demand for democratic accountability in which the Malian people have found the means to assure that their leaders answer for their actions. The Malian journey has not been smooth, nor free of breakdowns and roadblocks along the way. But the journey continues. A Malian graduate of MSU captured the essential and driving spirit for this journey: "Our democracy is young. But its future is bright if all of us, both men and women, will work together in good faith to assure that our beloved country continues to serve as one example for the rest of Africa" (personal communication, anonymous). When Modibo Keita and the Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Democratique Africain (US-RDA) helped achieve Mali's political independence in 1960, the new political leaders never questioned the need for ambitious state investments to mobilize the capital required for rapid economic growth. The central political issue was not whether the government should direct the economy, but which specific measures to use to achieve economic decolonization and economic independence from the French commercial monopolies (see Clark). In the countryside the Malian model of "rural socialism" encouraged smallholder production and idealized the village as a model of socialist organization . While the subject of some debate among the government's planners, the 245 246 R. JAMES BINGEN model protected peasant production units while relying heavily on political mobilization and control. The Keita regime believed that new village-level party committees could both revitalize traditional productive forces and create new political leadership in the countryside. At the same time, Keita reorganized the territorial administration of government in order to bring government closer to the people. The ironic result of these measures, however, was that Keita wiped out the very local structures that offered the most potential for promoting local responsibility (see Rawson). Most observers acknowledge that Keita's policies did achieve a measure of economic decolonization. But it is also widely acknowledged that the regime failed to construct rural socialism. On the contrary, in the face of peasant resistance , the party's increasingly repressive and authoritarian pressure in the countryside contributed to the government's demise. The effort by party militants to confiscate food grains signaled the political bankruptcy of Malian socialism, and there was little popular discontent when the regime fell to Traore's coup d'etat in November 1968. The Traore regime justified its takeover on the grounds that Keita's policies no longer represented the views of most Malians. The new National Liberation Committee (CMLN) was intended to rebuild majority rule and guide the country with a more open door policy to foreign assistance. The new regime successfully forestalled calls from many aid agencies to "liberalize" the economy until 1981 when it finally agreed to several IMF and World Bank fiscal and economic policies in return for significant budget support. Private commercial trading of food grains became the key feature of the government's Third Economic Plan (1981-85). After almost twenty years of strained relations between the state and private traders, this new, more liberal grain trade policy represented a significant step toward removing a long-standing source of political opposition. In the countryside, the Traore regime sought a new form of cooperation by creating official Tons villageois modeled on traditional forms of village mutual aid groups. Reminiscent of Keita's appeal to the "new man in the countryside," these new Tons were intended to be the base of collective action for rebuilding rural Mali. If the regime had been able to move beyond its rhetoric of collaboration with the country's producers and traders, it might have been able to chart a new future for Mali. In the short term, such rhetoric at least assured some degree of continued international political confidence and a flow of foreign aid. In retrospect , however, it is clear that the regime was neither willing to transfer a full measure of responsibility to the countryside nor accept the economic uncertainties of unfettered private...