Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists

Preface

ix Preface This book grew out a confrontation with a simple question: What is pragmatism? Perhaps I can save time for some readers by giving the answer: no one really knows. Ever since A. O. Lovejoy published “The Thirteen Pragmatisms” in 1908, any hope of permanently fixing a single meaning went out the window. Even now, the meaning of pragmatism is shifting, as it is appropriated and employed by philosophers, literary critics, historians, economists, art historians, and educators, to name just a few. Regardless, this book speaks confidently about “pragmatism” in an attempt to corral its meaning. (This is how one deals with unanswerable questions—one makes them their own.) A few qualifications, at the outset, seem in order. While my primary objective is to contrast “classical pragmatism” with “neopragmatism,” let me be clear that I am primarily concerned with classical pragmatism in the mode of John Dewey, though William James and Charles S. Peirce are called upon from time to time. As for “neopragmatism,” it too does not name a single, unified philosophy; therefore, I have confined my attention to the two most interesting and influential neopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Beyond Realism and Antirealism has two general aims, one historical , the other pragmatic. The historical aim is to evaluate the cogency of the neopragmatists’ interpretations of Dewey’s pragmatism and to use those conclusions to assess neopragmatism per se. The pragmatic aim is to determine whether or not neopragmatism is a way “beyond ” the realism/antirealism debate that currently consumes significant amounts of philosophical energy. Beyond Realism and AntiRealism x Acknowledgments Douglas Browning, my dissertation advisor at the University of Texas at Austin, deserves my deepest gratitude. Friend and mentor, he gave generous and conscientious attention to my philosophical ideas and made sure I acquired the habits necessary to keep learning. Appreciation is also due to Gregory Pappas, whose insights into John Dewey have been invaluable to my own understanding. Detailed comments and suggestions are the highest form of flattery in philosophy; Johanna Seibt, Frank X. Ryan, and Tom Burke all deserve special thanks. Cornelis de Waal, Associate Editor at the Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy , and Joseph Margolis were sympathetic readers whose sound advice is much appreciated. Peter Hare and the anonymous reviewers at the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society were exacting but constructive critics of my work on Dewey, Putnam, and Kenneth Burke. Jacob Smullyan provided critical assistance with the index. A special debt is owed to Larry Hickman for his indispensable contributions as an interpreter and editor of Dewey; in particular, his editorship of The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953: The Electronic Edition has provided scholars with a resource of inestimable value. Portions of Chapter 3 were drawn from “Progress in History: Dewey on Knowledge of the Past” in Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science 26 (2000), and from a paper, “History Is in the Making: Pragmatism , Realism, and Knowledge of the Past,” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Portland, Maine, in March 2002. Portions of Chapter 4 were drawn from “Putnam, Pragmatism, and Dewey,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 36, no. 1 (2000). I am grateful to the editors of the aforementioned journals for permission to reprint material from these articles . ...