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8. The Politics and Future of War Powers
- Vanderbilt University Press
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160 8 The Politics and Future ofWar Powers In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and as George Bush spoke of a “new world order,” the prospects for international peace and security seemed considerably better for the post–cold war world. Yet through the eight years of the Clinton presidency, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and even incidents of genocide continued in disturbingly high numbers. In response to violations of human rights, as part of peacebuilding operations, and in the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, the United States became engaged in a number of conflicts under Clinton’s leadership. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and with the American military response initiated on October 7, 2001, the United States is now involved in a new “war on terrorism” that which will target those responsible for the attacks on America as well as those states or organizations that harbor such terrorists. The use of force in American foreign policy thus remains a key component of U.S. national security policy in an uncertain world. For centuries, international jurists, and constitutional scholars have debated the question of when a government may legitimately use force abroad.1 In the United States, James Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention in 1787 offer Americans a historical record of how the founding fathers answered this question. Under the principle of checks and balances, Congress was given the power to “declare war.” The president, as commander in chief, can use force without congressional approval to “repel sudden attacks.” Otherwise, congressional authorization is needed before military action can be taken. Congress protected these powers when the United States joined the United Nations and NATO. During the cold war, however, presidents claimed unilateral powers as commander in chief when fighting communism, and Congress largely abdicated its constitutional responsibilities to the president. Congress attempted to reassert its war powers in 1973 un- The Politics and Future of War Powers 161 der the War Powers Resolution, but law has been ineffective in restoring a balance of power. With the widely perceived threat of communism accepted by most Americans, Congress pushed aside constitutional questions and responsibilities. However, with the Soviet Union’s collapse, less consensus in defining the nation’s security threats, and the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency, the prospects for a congressional reassertion of its war powers seemed strong, particularly considering the newly elected president’s inexperience in foreign policy and military affairs.2 These prospects ostensibly heightened when the GOP gained majority status in Congress in the 1994 midterm elections and later with the president in a weakened state during the impeachment proceedings. Yet despite these developments, the pattern of congressional deference largely remained the norm. This deference is best explained as resulting from the influence of various factors: the domestic political environment on the occasions when force was used, the roles of key congressional leaders in each instance, and the partisan political choices that shaped the war powers interplay. The evidence presented for these six cases suggests that congressional deference and presidential unilateralism in war powers involved many political variables that were specific to the time and conditions when force was used, which cannot be captured by viewing Congress’s deference simply as an institutional norm. The President As commander in chief, President Clinton’s constitutional arguments were very similar to those of other presidents in recent history. Clinton claimed essentially unilateral powers as commander in chief, as he and other top ranking officials in the executive branch consistently argued that Congress had no formal authority to restrict the president in any of his military deployments or uses of force. However, consideration of certain nuances of Clinton’s political strategies with Congress yield different insights and conclusions about the war powers interplay during his administration. With regard to the War Powers Resolution, when the domestic political conditions demanded, the Clinton administration clearly employed the rhetoric of “consultation” to appease members of Congress. This was especially true prior to IFOR, when Clinton was buying time [44.211.117.101] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 13:15 GMT) 162 The Clinton Wars to negotiate a peace agreement with Bosnian diplomats at Dayton, and because of the presence of an ostensibly assertive Republican majority that might reign in his exercise of perceived broad war powers. Very astutely, the president reached out to Congress in recognizing his responsibilities under the WPR. However, once the Dayton negotiations were concluded, it was clear that Clinton would deploy troops with...