Smoke in Their Eyes: Lessons in Movement Leadership from the Tobacco Wars

28. McCain to the Rescue

201 28 McCain to the Rescue For all the bipartisan rhetorical fist clenching and teeth gnashing at the perfidy of the tobacco industry, and for all the talk of irresistible momentum toward fierce, uncompromising legislation straitjacketing Big Tobacco, nothing was moving in the Congress. Matt’s fears that his fellow advocates’ uncompromising righteousness, congressional political positioning, and Clinton’s refusal to espouse concrete legislative proposals would arrest movement toward serious legislating seemed well grounded. He was hardly encouraged, either, when, in early March 1998, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott anointed Senate Commerce Committee chairman John McCain, from among the several competing committee chairs with jurisdictional claims on the legislation, to lead the Senate’s response to the settlement and its warring constituencies . Lott was no friend of strong tobacco control legislation; and his anointment of McCain was no sign of Lott’s blessing upon strong legislation. This move was not exactly a surprise. In a bizarre private meeting in early March with John Seffrin, CEO of the Cancer Society, Lott had launched into an unprovoked tirade. He derided “Dr. Kook and Dr Crazy” and challenged Seffrin: “Just look at Kessler’s eyes. They bulge out. He’s a fanatic.” Seffrin gamely defended Koop and Kessler, but Lott swept his protestations aside. “The tobacco companies are wimps,” he fumed. “If you want a settlement, you can probably get one, because the tobacco industry are wimps. However,” he admonished, shaking his finger at Seffrin, “if you ask for too much, you’ll get nothing.” And he told Seffrin that the Cancer Society should stick to research and leave the legislating to the Congress. Lott’s choice of McCain reflected his assessment that the Senate Commerce Committee was the least likely of the five committees that claimed and sought jurisdiction over at least part of the legislation to commit regulatory excess or offend the tobacco industry. Its Republi- 202 Smoke in Their Eyes cans were suitably conservative and high on the list of recipients of tobacco industry campaign contributions. And its two senior Democrats , Ernest “Fritz” Hollings and Wendell Ford, faithfully represented tobacco-growing South Carolina and Kentucky, respectively. Before the settlement, Matt had no relationship with John McCain, and minimal expectations of him. Indeed, in September 1997, Matt had risked McCain’s famed wrath by drafting a statement for the Center highly critical of McCain’s decision to introduce, with the Commerce Committee’s ranking Democrat, Hollings, legislation embodying the terms of the June 20 agreement. Matt: I had seen the bill that the industry was working on—and McCain’s bill was essentially it. Our organization was very fast out of the block to criticize it very strongly. Our Republican consultants warned us, “Very big mistake! McCain won’t forget. His intention wasn’t bad. We were too quick to jump. This is going to make it harder to develop a really good relationship with him.” But I felt then that we, uniquely, had a responsibility to prove that the settlement, without improvement, wouldn’t be adequate, and that, therefore , it was vitally important for us to send that message to the Hill—as well as to our own community. Earlier that summer, immediately following the June 20 settlement , Matt had asked former Republican congressman Vin Weber, a conservative highly respected by his former colleagues whom Matt had engaged as a contract lobbyist, to arrange a meeting with McCain. Wary, Matt nevertheless had found McCain engaged and open-minded. McCain was exceptionally supportive—not anything specific, but his interest in the issue seemed extraordinarily sincere. It was a general conversation , but a positive one. Still, I walked out of that meeting skeptical. McCain was better than I had expected him to be. But the committee as a whole was not. So my fear, in the fall of ’97, was that the industry would maneuver the bill to the Commerce Committee. It was the place where we had the least hope. But at least the meeting with McCain had given a hint that there was a sympathetic ear there. And during the ensuing months, Matt patiently set out to develop a working relationship with McCain’s Commerce Committee staff member assigned to tobacco legislation, Lance Bultima: The Rise and Fall of the McCain Bill 203 Lance, who had been charged with responsibility, hadn’t had any longterm contact with the public health community. He is a relatively conservative free-market...